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Abstract 
Previous studies show that, when people learn about or observe behaviors of 
others, they tend to make implicit inferences from these behaviors (Uleman, Saribay, 
& Gonzalez, 2008). In the present research, we aimed to determine the conditions 
under which people are more likely to make implicit goal inferences vs. trait 
inferences. In Studies 1 and 2, we analyzed the role of behavioral information 
received in the type of inference made. Specifically, we manipulated consistency of 
the actors’ behaviors as well as the distinctiveness of the actions (i.e., if the action is 
initiated towards a specific entity or not) in light of Kelley’s (1967) covariation 
principle. Study 1 showed that people tend to implicitly infer goals more from 
behaviors that include low consistency and low distinctiveness information compared 
to behaviors that include high consistency and high distinctiveness information. Study 
2 sought to replicate this finding using a separate paradigm. People were shown to 
make implicit goal inferences from behaviors with low consistency and low 
distinctiveness information. In Study 3, we analyzed inferences from simple behaviors 
(with no consistency or distinctiveness information) and the effect of perceivers’ 
motives on the type of inference made. We showed that people engage in both types 
of inferences from reading simple behaviors but only when they are motivated to 
make goal or trait inference. We also showed that chronic goals (related to personal 
need for structure and conservative ideology) may determine the type of inference 
made (i.e., higher tendency to make trait than goal inferences). Taken together, the 
present research revealed that the type of inference made depends on the type of 
information received as well as the specific (temporary or chronic) motivation of the 
perceiver.  
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Introduction 
Being able to understand others’ motivations as explanations for why they act 
and what they are likely to do next is critical for human beings (Heider & Simmel, 
1944; Jones & Davis, 1965). Importantly, such inferences provide not merely a sense 
of meaning and predictability in a complex social world, but understanding the 
motivational factors underlying an actor’s behavior may help the perceiver adjust 
his/her own attitudes and behavior towards this actor so that one may engage in 
appropriate behavior (Aarts, Gollwitzer, & Hassin, 2004; Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 
1996). Such tendency for an immediate causal explanation was discussed by Asch 
(1946): 
We look at a person and immediately a certain impression of his character 
forms itself in us (…) such impressions form with remarkable rapidity and 
great ease. (…) we can no more prevent its rapid growth than we can avoid 
perceiving a given visual object or hearing a melody. (p. 258).       
Recent research on social inferences shows that people have a tendency to 
make complex inferences such as inferences of intentionality from others’ behaviors 
automatically (e.g., Ham & Vonk, 2011, Malle & Holbrook, 2012). In other words, 
people tend to infer goals from other’s behaviors without necessarily having any 
intention or awareness. Even the earliest approaches in attribution research (which 
sow the seeds of folk psychology) indicated that people infer personal causalities 
(Heider, 1958, p. 100) as well as person-stimulus/situation interactions (McArthur, 
1972). However, most of the research in the area was concentrated on how people 
infer invariant personality traits from behaviors (except for some attempts to show 
people’s capability of capturing intraindividual variability or the interaction of 
behaviors with the stimuli and situations (Kammrath, Mendoza-Denton, & Mischel, 
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2005). More specifically, how people attribute others’ (context-dependent) goals is a 
relatively understudied phenomenon compared to the extensive work on the 
attributions of (context-independent) traits from behaviors (Hassin, Aarts, & 
Ferguson, 2005). Despite the potential importance of understanding/making 
predictions about the goals of others, and the degree to which this happens 
spontaneously (e.g., Hassin, Aarts, & Ferguson, 2005, Van Overwalle, Van 
Duynslaeger, Coomans, Timmermans, 2012), it is still not clearly shown when people 
tend to make goal as opposed to trait inferences and vice versa. The present research 
is an attempt to illustrate the mechanisms that differentiate among different types of 
social inferences in this sense. Specifically, in the present study, we focused on how 
the type of information received as well as the perceiver’s motives may affect the type 
of inference (goal vs. trait) made spontaneously about an actor.  
Attributions of Invariant vs. Variant Characteristics from Behaviors 
 How people evaluate the social behaviors of others is a critical question that 
has been investigated from various dimensions, and with different assumptions about 
the mechanism of social inference. What is common to most attribution research, 
however, is the focus on people’s tendencies to infer stable characteristics from 
others’ behaviors (Malle, 2008). Researchers suggested various explanations for why 
people tend to disregard information that would preclude making a dispositional 
inference. Heider (1958) stated that people usually don’t have access to the 
information beyond the disposition-implying behaviors of others. However, Jones and 
Nisbett (1971) went further and claimed that, even if the stimulus that might have 
affected the actor’s behavior is accessible to the perceiver, the perceiver ignores it to 
some extent (p. 87).  Specifically, they suggested that people are likely to make 
inferences that describe the behavior and the underlying factor in a “correspondent” 
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fashion (p. 223, Jones & Davis, 1965). According to this model, actor’s actions are 
perceived as being correspondent to his/her stable disposition(s). For instance, one’s 
“domineering action” is perceived as a reflection of the trait of being dominant (p. 
224, Jones & Davis, 1965). However, that model does not account for alternative 
types of inferences one might make, such as engaging in a domineering action for 
some specific reasons about the situation or the stimulus the actor interacts with (i.e., 
actor’s goals). Instead, the models which concentrate on the correspondence bias 
suggest that people usually sample biased information about others, focus on the 
consistency between the actor’s traits and actions and thus have an illusory perception 
of predictability about the actor’s future actions (Jones & Nisbett, 1971).  
The question of how the role of actors’ intentions and goals are inferred was 
incorporated in different ways into the early models of attribution. Heider’s (1958) 
definition of an actor’s intention as a disposition itself shows that he accepted 
intentions as an “inferential end” as Gilbert (1998) suggests. In other words, Heider 
(1958) seems to have a more dynamic understanding of “dispositions” which does not 
necessarily refer to invariant properties of the person per se. Nevertheless, as Malle 
(2008) also stated, attribution research that was influenced by Heider’s ideas seems to 
have overrelied on his argument of “extraction of dispositional properties of 
behaviors”, by misinterpreting his understanding of dispositions as well. Malle (2008) 
identified this tendency in attribution research as an “attribution error” in itself, due to 
overlooking Heider’s insight regarding the inferences of intentionality of the actors.  
Importantly, the tendency to extract dispositional properties from behaviors 
does not mean that Heider presupposes an “isomorphic relation” between these 
properties and behaviors, for two reasons (Gilbert, 1998, p. 94). First, Heider 
suggested that the perceived causes underlying behaviors are mostly ambiguous (e.g., 
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two dispositions may lead to the same behavior and one disposition may be 
manifested in different behaviors) (Heider, 1958, p. 36). Second, he accepted that 
people have a tendency to make goal attributions by accounting for the interaction 
between the person and the situation. He suggested that, “If a person brings about a 
number of changes in the environment, and one of them is generally considered much 
more attractive than the others, we will assume that it was the person’s goal” (Heider, 
1958, p. 115). That is to say, Heider (1958) does not seem to claim that these 
“extracted properties” of others have to be invariant personality characteristics as 
opposed to goals or intentions specific to certain circumstances. Similarly, we suggest 
that people should tend to make attributions of both variant and invariant properties of 
others from their behaviors, depending on the characteristics of the given information.  
Despite such dynamic perspective of attribution seen in the earliest work of 
naive psychology, the approaches to examining human inference that followed tended 
to focus on attributions of invariant aspects of personality from behaviors, after 
factoring out possible situational effects (for a review see Moskowitz, 2005, pp. 233-
266). Therefore, the phenomenon of intention attribution which should interact with 
situational effects is overshadowed by the studies embracing a dichotomy between 
personal and situational effects on behavior (Kammrath et al., 2005; Malle, 2008; 
Plaks, Shafer, & Shoda, 2003). Such a tendency started with Jones and Davis’ (1965) 
correspondent inference model’s focus on people’s inferences of invariant traits 
(rather than specific intentions) from others’ behaviors as mentioned above 
(Moskowitz, 2005). Attribution to intentions, on the other hand, was defined by Jones 
and Davis (1965) as “a necessary step in the assignment of more stable characteristics 
to the actor” (Jones & Davis, 1965, p.222). Thus, they suggested that actors’ 
intentions are merely perceived as mediating factors between one’s dispositions and 
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actions. If we go back to the previous example, even if the perceiver infers some 
specific intention of an actor to engage in a domineering action, s/he still uses this 
intention information to explain a stable disposition
1
 of the actor, in this view (Jones 
& Davis, 1965, p.224). In this sense, this approach assumes that perceivers should be 
motivated to extract information which differentiates that actor from another across 
different situations. Thus, the question, “how people do represent the intention of the 
actor in a given situation?”, seems to be engulfed by the question, “how do people 
represent the actor him/herself?”.  
A closer look at the theory of correspondent inferences, however, together 
with Kelley’s (1967) covariation model, provides some important insights for 
different types of causal explanations, depending on the information provided to the 
perceiver. In the correspondent inferences model, how unique the consequences of an 
actor’s action/choice is (noncommon effects principle) and how it differs from others’ 
possible actions/choices (social desirability principle) under given circumstances 
determine the type of inference a perceiver makes (Jones & Nisbett, 1971). More 
specifically, according to the noncommon effects principle, in order to understand the 
cause of an actor’s particular action, people compare the possible effects of the chosen 
and nonchosen actions of the actor (Jones & Davis, 1965). The effects of an actor’s 
action which differ from the effects of alternative (nonchosen) actions are called 
“noncommon effects” and these effects play a critical role in inference making. If 
these effects are few, they become more distinctive and more useful for making 
correspondent inferences about the actor (Jones & Davis, 1965). For example, if 
engaging in domineering action indicates a noncommon effect (e.g., making people 
recognize one’s authority) compared to other types of possible actions the actor can 
                                                          
1
 Unlike Heider’s (1958) approach, in Jones and Davis’ (1965) model, dispositions are accepted as the 
stable properties that are specific to the actor and differentiated from the actor intentions (p. 222).  
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potentially engage in (e.g., yielding or leaving alone), people become likely to 
attribute the disposition of “authoritarian” to the actor. However, if it is possible to 
consider other noncommon effects of this action (e.g., to be able to get a quick result), 
it becomes harder to make a correspondent trait inference about the actor (as being 
impatient becomes an alternative trait to being authoritarian). Therefore, Jones and 
Davis (1965) suggested that “distinctiveness of the effect” is an important factor in 
making correspondent disposition inferences. The social desirability principle, on the 
other hand, indicates that, as the consequence of an actor’s action is socially desirable 
(i.e., something that any person would want), it becomes less informative about the 
person’s disposition (Jones & Davis, 1965). For instance, if the domineering action is 
not desirable in a particular context, one should be comfortable making a 
correspondent trait inference about the actor compared to the situation in which it 
might be desirable. In other words, the more extraordinary one’s action is, the more 
possible the correspondent trait inference becomes.  
As exemplified above, Jones and Davis (1965) used their model to explain 
trait inferences. Moreover, they accepted intention attribution as an instrument for 
attributing traits to the actor, rather than an end in itself:  
The assignment of intention, (…), is a precondition for inferences concerning 
those underlying stable characteristics toward which the perceiver presses in 
attaching significance to action. As Heider (1958) argued, the perceiver 
ordinarily strives to discover the invariances which underlie manifest actions 
in order to stabilize the environment and render it more predictable. (p. 222).  
Importantly however, we suggest that their principles may also be utilized to 
describe how people infer potential goals or intentions of others from their behaviors 
without necessarily making trait inferences (Moskowitz, 2005).  For instance, if 
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engaging in a domineering action (as opposed to yielding or leaving alone) allows one 
to gain the recognition of others, it is possible to attribute the goal of gaining the 
recognition of others to the actor without necessarily attributing him/her with the trait 
of being authoritarian. Again, engaging in an action which is not necessarily socially 
desirable rather than engaging in a desirable action may tell us about the specific goal 
(which allows the actor to deviate from others) as well as the trait of the actor. In this 
sense, we suggest that noncommon effect and social desirability principles of 
correspondent inferences (Jones & Davis, 1965) may explain both trait and goal 
attributions. Therefore, the correspondent inference model’s exclusive focus on the 
trait attributions does not mean that this model is incompatible with or may not be 
used to explain goal attributions (Moskowitz, 2005).   
Kelley’s (1967) Covariation Model and the Role of Information Received in the 
Type of Inference Made 
The principles of noncommon effects and social desirability were embraced by 
Kelley’s (1967) model as well (for a review see, Gilbert, 1998). Importantly however, 
the focus on the analysis of the effects of actions in Jones and Davis’ approach 
evolved into the focus on the analysis of the possible cause of actions in Kelley’s 
approach (Moskowitz, 2005). For instance, according to Kelley, people evaluate the 
possible causes of behaviors like a scientist and the possibility of a factor’s producing 
a behavior is discounted when other possible alternative causes are detected 
(discounting effect) (Kelly, 1972). Kelley’s (1967) model relies on the metaphor of 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), in that a perceiver engages in an analysis of a set of 
variables that contribute to the occurrence of the observed behavior. The person can 
be seen as belonging to one of several possible levels of each variable, yielding a 
perceived cause for the behavior that corresponds to the specific cell in this ANOVA 
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in which the person’s behavior would fall. In this analysis, perceivers rely on the 
covariation of the possible cause and the behavior observed, by taking into 
consideration 1) how consistently the actor engages in this same behavior in the same 
situations over time (consistency), 2) how specific the behavior is to one entity or 
situation for the actor (distinctiveness), and 3) how likely that other people would 
respond in a similar way under the same circumstances in the same situation 
(consensus) (Kelley, 1967). So in order to make a dispositional attribution such as 
“authoritarian”, a perceiver should evaluate whether the actor always engages in a 
domineering action or not, whether the actor engages in a domineering action while 
interacting with any group or not, and whether other people engage in a similar 
domineering action in this condition or not. Although, on the surface, Kelley’s 
covariation approach seems to target internal (dispositional) and external (situational) 
attributions for the causes of actors’ behaviors, these three factors of information he 
identifies can explain causal attributions beyond such a dichotomy, as the present 
research aims to show. That is to say, research which was influenced by the theory of 
correspondent inferences and the model of covariance mostly relied on the 
disposition-situation dichotomy in explaining inference making processes (Malle, 
2008). However, a closer look at the model may provide us insight about how people 
make inferences without separating or “factoring out” situation effects necessarily, 
rather, by accounting for the situational effects on dispositions in a more complex 
schema (Kammrath et al., 2005).     
 Research on the attribution of invariant characteristics mostly adopted the 
assumption that people extract person and situation information separately and add 
them up in making inferences (Kammrath et al., 2005). In the classic stage theories of 
attribution, trait attribution is conceptualized as an earlier step than the situational 
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attribution, which is referred to as a correction process in that it modifies the already-
formed dispositional inference to take into account or correct for the influence of the 
situation (e.g., Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988; Gilbert, Krull, & Pelham, 1988).  For 
example, even if the perceiver knows that the actor was threatened to act in a 
domineering way (such as a hypothetical policeman following orders from superiors 
to domineer the protesters of the government), such situational information of “the 
policeman being threatened” would be used to “correct” the fast inference of a 
domineering disposition. Jones (1979) described this as akin to an anchoring effect, in 
which the trait serves as the anchor for subsequent judgment, which when adjusted 
use the anchor as the base. In these “correction” models, disposition attribution is 
defined as a cognitively efficient way of making judgments of others while one’s 
consideration of situational constraints is related to a perceiver’s motivation and 
capacity to engaging in such inferences (Gilbert, 1998). Further research showed that 
situational attribution sometimes may happen earlier than dispositional 
attribution/correction, when one is specifically motivated to process situational more 
than the dispositional information implied in the behavior (Krull & Erickson, 1995; 
Lupfer, Clark, & Hutcherson, 1990). However, what was common in all these studies, 
together with the assumption of “factoring out” the situational information in the 
earlier works elaborated above, is the tendency to disregard the potential inferences 
people make about an actor interacting with a specific context or stimuli. Specifically, 
the prevalent approach in the area which embraces a person-situation dichotomy in 
attribution underestimated that perceivers may make attributions about the actor by 
evaluating his/her actions with regard to the situation s/he is in or to the stimuli s/he 
interacts with. For example, if the actor engages in a domineering action when s/he 
interacts with a certain group of people or in a job context only, the perceiver may 
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evaluate the action with regard to the entity or situation information provided and 
conclude that, this actor wants to control this certain group or follow his/her boss’ 
instructions. Namely, the perceiver may make inferences about the goals of the actor 
rather than traits, if s/he processes the actor’s action as being dependent on certain 
entity(s) or situation(s) (i.e., variant characteristics of the person).  
More recent research showed that, in addition to (and sometimes even before) 
traits, people may infer both the situation and the intention of the actor from the given 
information (Ham & Vonk, 2003; Todd, Molden, Ham, & Vonk, 2011; Reeder et al., 
2004). For instance, when the behavior information tentatively implies both the 
actor’s trait and the situation properties as is the case in “Will talks during the lecture” 
(trait: impolite, situation: boring), people are equally likely to make such inferences in 
an automatic way (Ham & Vonk, 2003). Besides such evidence on the co-occurrence 
of different types of inferences, the multiple inference model (MIM) suggested by 
Reeder and his colleagues (2001) pointed out that situation information can be used 
by the perceiver to make inferences about the actors’ motivation (e.g. actors were 
inferred as having lower motivation to kick a ball in a situation that potentially 
inhibits the performance). Inferred intentions, in turn, are used to make further trait 
attributions about the actor (e.g., attribution of higher motivation predicted attribution 
of less ability). Thus, overreliance on the situation-disposition dichotomy in 
attribution research seems to be undermined by such alternative perspectives which 
define attributions as “multifaceted, composed of inferences about goals, motives, and 
traits” (Reeder et al., 2004, p. 541). It is critical, in this sense, to determine the 
characteristics of the behaviors that facilitate certain types of inferences.  
Trait vs. Goals: Two Ways of Understanding Others’ Actions 
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Traits are broadly defined as the categories which inform people about an 
actor’s personality and, more specifically behaviors, attributes and feelings across 
different contexts (Cantor & Mischel, 1977, 1979). Traits, therefore, are especially 
useful in order to be able to make predictions about an actor’s behavior in a totally 
new context (Hoffman, Mischel, & Mazze, 1981; Uleman, Newman, & Moskowitz, 
1996). Winter and his colleagues (1998) summarize the common description of this 
concept in different approaches as “referring to people’s stylistic and habitual patterns 
of cognition, affect and behavior rather than to their wishes, desires, and goals” (p. 
232). All trait measures, they point out, target at measuring internal tendencies that 
are consistent across situations and are temporally stable.    
  Goals, on the other hand, can be defined as the end-states people desire to 
reach or avoid (Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996; Winter et al., 1998). In this sense, 
goals can be differentiated from traits conceptually. First, they can be differentiated in 
terms of the malleability of and controllability by the actor and second, in terms of the 
actor’s interaction with an entity or a situation.  
Unlike traits, goals are dynamic. Kruglanski and his colleagues (2002) refer to 
this characteristic of goals:  
(…) a static depiction does miss something important about motivation, 
namely its malleability and dynamism: Our wishes, interests, desires are rarely 
so steadfast or constant. Often, they fluctuate from one moment to the next as 
we succumb to an assortment of distractions, temptations, and digressions.” 
(pp. 332-333).  
Due to their flexibility, goals can account for the intraindividual variability in 
people’s behaviors mentioned in the previous section. They are hardly stable, as they 
represent an endeavor to reduce the discrepancy between one’s current state and the 
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end state (Moskowitz, 2012). The strength of this endeavor depends on various factors 
such as the environmental opportunities that allows for the goal attainment (Bargh et 
al., 2001; Förster, Liberman, & Friedman, 2007;) and the obstacles to goal pursuit 
(Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel, & Schaal, 1999). The strength of the goal increases 
when one has an opportunity to attain the goal and is blocked from attaining it 
(Kruglanski et al., 2002; Moskowitz, 2012), unlike a personality characteristic which 
is supposed to reflect a person’s temporally stable dispositions.  
Another factor which provides goals such flexibility is their controllability by 
the actor. That is to say, goals should be regularly chosen by the actor to some extent 
and attained by her/his commitment to specific strategies either explicitly or implicitly 
(Bargh, 1990; Gollwitzer, 1993; Moskowitz, 2012). Traits, however, are perceived as 
including features that are beyond being controllable by the actor (Winter et al., 
1998). Consistent with that suggestion, people may be more likely to explain others’ 
behaviors with reference to traits than their own behaviors, as Jones and Nisbett 
(1971) stated, “traits exist more in the eye of the beholder than in the psyche of the 
actor” (p. 89). Indeed, classic work on the actor-observer difference reveals people 
use situations as the context through which they understand their own behavior, but 
less so for understanding others (where a correspondence bias has been the more 
traditional effect; Jones & Nisbett, 1971). 
Another characteristic of goals that may differentiate them from traits is their 
strong association with a “goal object” which can be “an entity, event, experience, 
characteristic and so on (…)” (Elliot & Fryer, 2008, p. 245). Bargh (1990) specified in 
his auto-motive model that goals are strongly linked to the representations of 
environmental properties. That is to say, when an environmental feature is triggered, a 
goal associated with that feature in the memory is automatically activated and guides 
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the behavior (Bargh, 1990). For instance, Aarts and Dijksterhuis (2003) showed that 
priming people with the context of library increases the accessibility of the goal-
directed behavior of being silent. Such association between the goal and the situation 
can either be established by previous co-occurrences as in the library example, or it 
can be formulated as an implementation intention in a single occurrence (Förster, 
Liberman, & Friedman, 2007). Specifically in implementation intention work, 
Gollwitzer (1993) suggested that a formulation of an action as “doing x when 
encountering situation y” facilitates the initiation of such goal-directed behavior. 
Goals can also be associated with any other entity, such as other individuals in the 
actor’s life. For instance, partners of different types of relationship (e.g., mother, 
spouse, friend) were shown to prime different types of relationship goals (Fitzsimons 
& Bargh, 2003; Shah, 2003). All in all, goal-directed actions are accepted as being 
necessarily associated with a goal-object (Elliot & Fryer, 2008; Moskowitz & 
Gesundheit, 2009), unlike traits which are defined as rather abstract concepts that are 
not necessarily bound to an entity or situation (Winter et al., 1998).  
Traits should be represented more abstractly and broadly than goals, although 
they can be associated with multiple goals of the actor (e.g., Read, Jones, & Miller, 
1990). Supporting that suggestion, for example, it was shown that categorization of 
behaviors in terms of actors’ goals provides a better memory of these behaviors than 
categorization of these behaviors in terms of actor’s traits (Hoffman, Mischel, & 
Mazze, 1981). Hoffman et al. (1981) suggested that traits may not be the best tools to 
organize behavioral information due to their “intrusive, nondistinctive nature” as 
opposed to goals’ “cohesive, rule-guided” nature (p. 223). That is not to say, however, 
that traits do not include goal-directed actions (Read, Jones, & Miller, 1990). For 
example, a person who is identified as being gregarious can be expected to have the 
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goal of socializing with people -as Read et al. (1990) showed-, yet, the goal of 
socializing should not be enough by itself to identify a person as “gregarious”. Again, 
taking into account Hoffman and his colleagues’ (1981) findings, the behavior of 
“talking a lot with the people in a party” may be better coded in memory in terms of a 
goal of “socializing” than the trait of “gregariousness”. This should be observed 
especially when the situation information such as “party” is available to the perceiver, 
as goals are contingent on the actor-situation interactions.  
   Despite such potential differences between traits and goals, these constructs 
are not easy to tease apart (Kammrath et al., 2005; Read et al., 1990; & Trope, 1989). 
One reason is the differential meanings attributed to these concepts by different 
models which aim to highlight certain features of the personality systems. 
Particularly, the cognitive-affective system theory of personality referred to traits as 
dynamic units, after conceptualizing them as general structures of personality which 
consist of actor’s beliefs, values and goals (cognitive-affective units: CAU) (Mischel 
& Shoda, 1995; Mischel, Mendoza-Denton, & Shoda, 2002). Therefore, the situation-
behavior interactions that we will call implications of an actor’s goal in the present 
study are referred as traits or personality characteristics by the scholars of CAU due to 
such difference in the conceptualization. Notwithstanding such differences in 
conceptualization, this model is in parallel with the present study’s focus on 
perceivers’ capacity and tendency to have regard for variability of actors’ behaviors 
across different situations and entities. More specifically, according to the CAU 
model, perceivers use a complex rather than an additive schema of the actor’s trait and 
the situation in which behavior is initiated (Kammrath et al., 2005). Kammrath and 
her colleagues (2005) made people rate the likelihood of an actor’s behaving in a 
“trait-consistent” way in their interactions with different entities and showed that 
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people expect variability in such behaviors. Namely, for example, a person who is a 
“kiss-up” was expected to behave more warmly to people of a higher status than to 
people with a lower status. Importantly however, the concepts they used as traits such 
as “kiss-up” can be imagined to differ across situations by nature, which render them 
closer to our definition of goals.
2
 All in all, it is important to keep in mind such 
differences in conceptualizations which do not necessarily lead to contradictions 
between these existing models and our suggestions about making inferences of 
variable characteristics of others.  
Goal Inferences: Evidence from Attribution and Multiple Inferences Research 
 Research on social inferences has mostly relied on the attribution theories 
reviewed in the first section. Namely, people’s inferences of actor’s dispositions and 
the situation were interpreted either within stage models (which suggest that people 
identify and add up dispositional and situational information separately) or complex 
schema models (which suggest that people perceive dispositions in an interaction with 
the situation/entity) (Gilbert, 1998; Kammrath et al., 2005; Plaks et al., 2003). Despite 
the extensive work which provides evidence for both intentional and spontaneous 
forms of trait and situation inferences, inferences for intentions and goals of the actor 
are relatively understudied. In this section, I will briefly review the research on 
people’s tendency to infer goals and intentions from others’ behaviors either explicitly 
or implicitly.  
Some early work on social inference depicted a trade-off between inferences 
of ulterior motives and the traits of the actors (Fein, Hilton, & Miller, 1990; Jones, 
Davis, & Gergen, 1961). Jones, Davis, and Gergen (1961), for instance, showed that 
                                                          
2
 They also showed in the same study that these trait constructs are strongly related to certain goals 
(e.g., kiss-up: goal to impress). Therefore, it looks like the concepts which imply such variability in 
behavior come from the goal-subset of the traits in their model.  
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perceivers are more reluctant to make trait inferences about actors whose self-
descriptions are consistent with the requirements of a job description (i.e., indicating 
an ulterior motive of self-presentation) than those whose self-descriptions were 
inconsistent with the requirements. That is to say, it becomes harder for the perceiver 
to differentiate the actor’s trait from his/her ulterior motive when behaviors meet the 
expectations of a situation (i.e., job requirement). However, when behavior deviates 
from the expectations, people become more likely to make trait attributions, as motive 
attributions no longer make sense. Another support for this inverse relationship 
between trait and motive attribution came from the research by Fein, Hilton, and 
Miller (1990). They applied a twist on the classic correspondence bias paradigm in 
which people read the essays written by actors under free-choice or constraint (no 
choice) conditions. Previous research repeatedly showed that people tend to associate 
actors’ dispositions with the position they held in this essay, even if they had no 
choice in selecting that position (Jones & Harris, 1967; Snyder & Jones, 1974). 
However, Fein, Hilton, and Miller (1990) demonstrated that people’s attribution bias 
disappears when they receive information implying the actor’s ulterior motive (i.e., 
ingratiating himself to a professor) in taking a specific position in the essay.  This 
means that, as long as the motive-implying information is provided, people tend to 
infer ulterior motives of actors from their behaviors, which in turn reduces their 
tendency to make trait attributions.  
Research on multiple inferences, on the other hand, showed that people can 
infer both motives and traits of an actor simultaneously but the former (motive 
attribution) should be the priority as it is also necessary for the latter (trait attribution) 
(Reeder, 2005). Reeder and his colleagues (2004) showed that people infer actors’ 
ulterior motives implicitly, and such inference predicts their related trait attributions 
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about the actor. Furthermore, Malle and Holbrook (2012) compared people’s 
likelihood and speed of making inferences about the actor’s intentionality, belief, 
desire, and personality. They showed that people are both more likely to make and 
faster at making judgments of intentionality and desire of the actor rather than belief 
and (especially) personality judgments (even for trait-implying behaviors). Results 
both from Reeder and Malle’s labs supported their common claim that personality 
inferences should come after goal inferences. In other words, as goals provide more 
concrete and less ambiguous schemas about the actor, they should be the priority in 
the eye of the perceiver (Malle & Holbrook, 2012; Read, Jones, & Miller, 1990; 
Reeder, 2009; Reeder & Trafimow, 2005).  
Nevertheless, these studies do not provide us information about how people 
switch from making goal inferences to trait inferences. Reeder and his colleagues 
(2004), for example, manipulated the ulterior motive of the actor and made people 
rate the possibility that the actor had a related trait in a forced response format. They 
found a strong relation between motive and trait attribution as a result. Malle and 
Holbrook (2012) used different behaviors implying either actors’ goals or traits, 
which makes it hard to interpret how people infer goals and traits from behaviors 
which are not tailored to goals or imply traits specifically. Therefore, neither of these 
procedures provides an answer to the question of when people’s goal inferences do or 
do not lead to trait inferences.  
 Relevant to this question, Plaks and his colleagues (2003) showed that people 
tend to make goal inferences when they learn about an actor’s behavior which 
systematically varies across different contexts. For example, an actor who is highly 
conscientious about getting good grades but not conscientious in other domains (i.e., 
being fit or independent) was rated as having a goal-directed behavior for getting 
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good grades. Nevertheless, the perceived trait of “conscientiousness” was pre-
measured and kept constant across different domains in this research. Therefore, the 
question, how likely people are to judge this actor in terms of his goal (i.e., having the 
goal of getting good grades) rather than trait (i.e., being conscientious) is still left 
unanswered in this study.  
Implicit Social Inferences: Are Goal Inferences Implicit / Automatic? 
Following the general approach to social inferences, research on implicit 
inferences also mostly concentrated on inferences on actors’ traits (for a review see, 
Uleman, Newman, & Moskowitz, 1996). After Smith and Miller’s (1983) 
demonstration of people’s speed at answering questions about the actor (e.g., 
intentionality, trait), research started to accumulate on social inferences that occur 
outside of the perceiver’s awareness. However this research focused on Spontaneous 
Trait Inferences (STIs) only (Uleman, Rim, Saribay, & Kressel, 2012). Generally in 
these studies, people are instructed to memorize actors’ behavior sentences, and their 
tendency of associating such behavior with a specific trait of the actor in memory was 
measured. For instance, in the false recognition paradigm, people are asked to learn 
behavior descriptions of actors matched with the actor photos for a later memory task 
(Todorov & Uleman, 2002). In the recognition phase, they are asked whether they 
remember seeing a given word in this actor's behavior description. Comparison of 
false recognition for the critical trials (in which a trait was not included but implied) 
with the control trials (in which the trait word did appear) informs the experimenters 
about participants’ likelihood of binding a trait automatically with a specific actor 
based on his/her given behavior information. Using this and similar memory 
paradigms, such as cued recall, probed recall/recognition, savings in relearning, and 
lexical decision, researchers were able to conclude that STIs are unintentional, fast 
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(i.e., occur at an early stage of memory formation) and linked to the actors (i.e., they 
are not just behavior summaries) (Carlston & Skowronski, 1994; Moskowitz, 1993a; 
Moskowitz, 1993b; Todorov & Uleman, 2002; Uleman, Newman, & Moskowitz, 
1996; Zarate, Uleman, & Voils, 2001).
3
  
On the other hand, there is only a handful of research on automatic goal 
inferences within the literature of social inferences, despite various supporting 
evidence for the spontaneity of goal inferences in other subfields of psychology. 
Developmental research, for instance, highlighted the importance of identifying 
actors’ goals by showing that this ability is intact as early as 2 years of age (Gergely, 
Nádasdy, Csibra, & Bíró, 1995). Research with adult chimpanzees also verified goal 
attribution, indicating that such inferences may not require humans’ capacity of 
cognitive regulation (Uller & Nichols, 2000). Furthermore, research on text 
comprehension also supported perceivers’ automatic tendency to infer protagonist’s 
goals, as they both focus on goal-implying behaviors more and also tend to reread 
actions which imply goals inconsistent with the protagonist’s (Poynor & Morris, 
2003). All these findings suggest that goal inferences people make should be as 
automatic as trait inferences.  
One of the studies which directly measured automaticity of goal inferences 
was conducted by Hassin, Aarts and Ferguson (2005). They applied a cued-recall 
procedure for behaviors which either implied the actor’s goal or not (Study 1). Results 
showed that, although people were not instructed to form any kind of impressions 
                                                          
3
 In the present research, we use the term automatic and implicit to refer to the perceivers’ no specific 
intention in and awareness of making such social inferences. Perceivers may not have an intention to 
engage in these social inferences as the task explicitly demands another cognitive activity 
(memorization) than inference formation (Winter &Uleman, 1984). Also, they may or may not be 
aware of having conducted such inferences. As indicated by Bargh (1994) social cognitive processes 
vary in terms of the level of automaticity and only a few of these processes has all the features of fully 
automatic processes (no control, intention or awareness of the actor as well as efficiency in processing). 
Therefore, even though people are aware of making these inferences at some level, these processes may 
still be referred as automatic as they do not require intention of the perceiver and they occur as fast as 
encoding the behavioral information.  
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about the actor, they automatically make goal inferences, as goal-cues helped them 
better recall such scenarios. In order to test that such inferences are beyond just being 
inferences about “predicted actions”, in the second study, they used behaviors 
implying “blocked goals” (as goals should become stronger once blocked), and thus 
the actions were not predicted by the behaviors. They replicated the results with this 
manipulation. In the third and fourth studies, they showed that people make goal 
inferences at the encoding stage of memory formation (i.e., just like they make trait 
inferences) and they replicated the findings through a different paradigm (i.e., the 
lexical decision task).   
After Hassin and his colleagues’ (2005) work on Spontaneous Goal Inferences 
(SGIs), a few studies attempted to uncover the extent of such inferences. Dik and 
Aarts (2008), for example, showed that, perceived effort of the actor mediates SGIs, 
suggesting that an actor’s higher effort in goal-directed behavior makes that goal more 
interesting to discover and thus easier to infer. Other studies compared STIs and SGIs 
by analyzing perceiver’s speed of identifying the goals vs. traits in behavior 
descriptions. Neuroscientific evidence suggested that people are faster at making SGIs 
as they identify a trait-inconsistent word in a behavior after about 600 ms and goal-
inconsistent word within 200 ms of exposure (as supported by the activation in 
temporo-parietal junction) (Van der Cruyssen, Van Duynslaeger, Cortoos & Van 
Overwalle, 2009; Van Duynslaeger, Sterken, Van Overwalle, & Verstraeten, 2008; 
Van Duynslaeger, Van Overwalle, & Verstraeten, 2007). Further research also 
showed that people are even faster (at about 150 ms) at detecting the words that may 
imply both a goal and a trait (Van Overwalle, Van den Eede, Baetens, & 
Vandekerckhove, 2009). These scholars made some speculations on the heightened 
diagnosticity of the behaviors which allow multiple inferences. However, it still looks 
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unclear what type of inference people actually make from such behaviors. Do they 
prefer one over the other, and what kind of behavioral information allows the 
transition between different inferences? 
Most relevant to the purpose of the present study, Van Overwalle and his 
colleagues (2012) compared SGIs with STIs within a false recognition paradigm. 
Specifically, participants were asked to read behavior sentences that either imply 
goals or traits (single inference), or imply both goals and traits (multiple inference). 
After each behavior, they were asked to report (within a specific deadline) whether 
they saw a trait or goal word in the behavior sentence they just read. People falsely 
recognized goal words in the behavior sentences in both the single-inference and 
multiple-inference sentences (verifying SGI) while they falsely recognized the trait 
words only in the multiple-inference sentences with no deadline of response. Van 
Overwalle et al. (2012) concluded that, people infer goals faster than traits, based on 
the evidence showing that SGIs are made as early as 350 ms of exposure but STIs are 
made only if SGIs are also made, and only when there is no time limit of response. 
These findings suggest that SGIs are necessary but not sufficient for STIs.  
Despite being informative about SGIs and STIs in this sense, we suggest that 
this study has some limitations in terms of the comparison of the two processes. First 
and foremost, the goal-implying sentences they used imply very low level goals 
which are simply the expected results of given behaviors (e.g., action: jumping into 
the water, goal: swimming) (these sentences are also very similar to McKoon and 
Ratcliff’s (1986) sentences for predictable actions). In other words, such results do not 
inform us whether people are likely to make implicit inferences of more abstract goals 
which should require referring to others’ mental states rather than predicting the 
natural result of their action (e.g. action: swimming, trait: athletic, goal: losing 
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weight).  Moreover, as with much of the other existing research on goal inferences, 
this study falls short of explaining when people infer a characteristic as a goal or as a 
trait. Taking into account both the neuroscientific evidence on the activation of 
similar pathways (but at different speeds) and the behavioral evidence on the 
necessity of SGIs for making STIs, it becomes tricky but especially important to 
figure out when people become more likely to make goal or trait inferences and what 
kind of behavioral information facilitates a specific type of inference.    
Covariation Principle Revisited: Differentiating Trait and Goal Inferences 
 Kelley (1967) proposed that people interpret behaviors in terms of the 
variations between three pieces of information; information about entities, persons 
and time/modalities. As mentioned above, in order to obtain these pieces of 
information, people rely on the cues which are informative about the distinctiveness, 
consensus and consistency dimensions of the behavior. Some research has analyzed 
the causal attributions people make for the behaviors with various combinations of 
these dimensions. Importantly, most of the research on covariation-based models has 
focused on the below-defined “prototypical configurations” of these dimensions 
(LLH: low consensus, low distinctiveness, high consistency; HHH: high consensus, 
high distinctiveness, high consistency; HLL: high consensus, low distinctiveness, low 
consistency) which predict person, stimulus and situation attributions respectively 
(e.g., Cheng & Novick, 1990; Hilton, Smith, & Kim, 1995). Nevertheless, we suggest 
that people should be capable of making attributions about the interactions of these 
units (i.e., person, stimulus and situation) implicitly, and alternative configurations of 
Kelley’s dimensions (e.g., LHH: low consensus, high distinctiveness, high 
consistency; LLL: low consensus, low distinctiveness, low consistency) account for 
such sophisticated attributions.  
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Empirical research revealed that dispositional attributions are predicted by the 
combination of low consensus, low distinctiveness and high consistency (LLH) 
pattern in the actor’s behavior. McArthur (1972) showed that an attribution to the 
person is mostly affected by the information of whether the actor gives the same 
response for different entities or not. The behaviors which occur similarly for various 
entities (i.e., low distinctiveness) were interpreted as being informative about the 
actor. In addition to distinctiveness, the information of whether the actor engages in a 
similar behavior all the time under similar circumstances (i.e., high consistency) 
predicted the likelihood of person attribution. Consensus information was also found 
to be a predictor of person attribution (despite being the one with least importance 
among the three), as the deviance of an actor’s action from others’ actions reduces the 
likelihood of “social desirability” in the eye of the perceiver, and in turn facilitates 
causal attributions to the actor (see Jones & Davis, 1965). In addition to these studies 
which show people think that the behaviors with LLH combination say “something 
about the person”, later studies specified that these behaviors are believed to say 
something about the “traits” of the person (Bassili, 1989; Hilton, Smith, & Kim, 1995; 
Van Overwalle 1997a, 1997b).
4
 Other than person attributions, scholars mostly 
focused on stimulus and situation attributions by utilizing Kelley’s formulation. 
People were found to make attributions to the stimulus more frequently when such 
behavior occurs every time (high consistency) one interacts with this stimulus but not 
with the others (high distinctiveness) and everybody acts the same under similar 
circumstances (high consensus) (HHH) (McArthur, 1972; Trope, 1986). On the other 
hand, results varied when it comes to which combination of these dimensions 
                                                          
4
 Important to mention here, these studies showing the relationship between LLH pattern and person 
attribution used traits to measure person attributions and they also talked about the concepts of 
person/disposition attribution and trait attribution interchangeably. So this conceptualization of 
person/disposition attribution  diverges from Heider’s approach to disposition as a dynamic and 
variable (which can define person’s goals).  
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facilitate people’s attributions to the situation or occasion5. McArthur (1972) found 
that, people make attributions to the situation or occasion when behavior occurs with 
a specific entity only (high distinctiveness) and for the first time (low consistency) 
and such attribution is not affected much by consensus information. Van Overwalle 
(1997a, 1997b), on the other hand, showed that low consistency information was the 
only predictor of situation attribution and other dimensions were not that critical to 
this kind of attribution.  
Previous research also showed that people sometimes report the cause of the 
behavior as “something about the interaction of person and stimulus”, although these 
researches did not make any further attempt to interpret what such an interaction 
might mean. McArthur (1972) mentioned that an interaction-attribution occurs when 
an actor (unlike others) behaves repeatedly in a certain way but only with a certain 
entity (LHH: low consensus, high distinctiveness and high consistency) or when an 
actor (as well as others) behaves repeatedly in a certain way for different entities 
(HLH: high consensus, low distinctiveness and high consistency). However, 
MacArthur suggested that while the former combination (LHH) indicates a true 
interaction between the person and the stimulus, the latter combination (HLH) 
indicates a “dual causality” meaning that both the person and the stimulus may be 
responsible for the occurrence of this action. Further studies replicated attribution to 
person-stimulus interaction for only behaviors with a LHH pattern (Hilton, Smith, & 
Kim, 1995; Jaspars, Hewstone, & Fincham, 1983; Van Overwalle, 1997a, 1997b). It 
is important to keep in mind that in all these studies participants selected the option of 
“something about the combination of person and stimulus” as the best explanation of 
such behavior among the other options provided by the experimenters. In the present 
                                                          
5
 Van Overwalle (1997a, 1997b ) uses the word occasion as synonym of situation.  
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study we suggest that this “something” can be the goal of the actor by taking into 
account the characteristics of the goals reviewed in the section of Traits vs. Goals.  
In addition to the interaction between person and stimulus, goals are suggested 
to be represented in terms of an interaction between person and situation as well (e.g., 
Bargh, 1990). Research based on Kelley’s covariation principle revealed a tendency 
to make attributions to person-situation interactions for the behaviors with an LLL 
pattern (low consensus, low distinctiveness, low consistency) (Hilton, Smith, & Kim, 
1995; Van Overwalle, 1997a, 1997b). Therefore, such a pattern can also imply the 
goals of the actor. Nevertheless, as the low consistency in a behavior is the strong and 
only predictor of situational attributions (Van Overwalle, 1997a, 1997b), we 
suggested that situational attributions may still engulf the attributions to goal of the 
actor in this scenario. For example, take the behavior, “Anna never dusts and vacuums 
her room but she always does before her boyfriend stops by.” This behavior is an 
example of high consistency and high distinctiveness, as Anna always cleans her 
room but only when she is going to interact with a certain entity (her boyfriend). With 
low consistency and low distinctiveness, it becomes “Anna never dusts and vacuums 
her room but she once did in case anyone stops by.” Here, we suggest that, although 
this pattern may imply a goal as well, it should be a more short-term one than the one 
implied by a LHH pattern. As the behavior occurs for the first time (low consistency), 
it should not imply a long-term goal of the actor but rather possibly imply a goal 
initiated by a specific situation for a limited period of time (e.g., her room is so dirty 
that she feels like she has to clean it up). Also, this behavior does not occur as a 
reaction to a specific entity but rather occurs in the same way for every entity the 
actor interacts with (low distinctiveness). For those reasons, behaviors with LHH and 
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LLL patterns should imply goals, yet, potentially different types of goals of the actors 
(long-term vs. short-term). 
The Role of Motivation in Implicit Inferences 
In addition to the role of received information on the type of inference one 
might engage in, people’s specific (chronic as well as manipulated) goals might have 
an effect on the type of inference made from behaviors of others. In the present study, 
we also explored the effect of chronic as well as situationally imposed goals on 
forming goal vs. trait inferences.  
Despite the abundance of research on implicit inferences, to our knowledge, 
there is only one published study focusing on the effect of perceivers’ chronic goals 
on their tendency to make implicit trait inferences. In this study, Moskowitz (1993) 
analyzed personal need for structure (PNS) as a factor that may result in higher STIs 
overall due to high PNS people’s higher motivation to engage in categorical thinking 
and heuristic processing. His findings supported this hypothesis; people with high 
PNS were found to be more likely to form spontaneous trait inferences from others’ 
behaviors compared to people with low PNS. Taking this into account, in the present 
study, we explored the effect of PNS on implicit trait and goal inferences. 
Another factor that may be related to the motivation of engaging in inference 
making is political ideology. Previous research found that conservatives tend to rely 
on dispositional factors whereas liberal rely on rather situation factors in explaining 
the cause of homelessness (Pellegrini et al., 1997), poverty (Zucker & Weiner, 1993), 
crime (Carroll, Perkowitz, Lurigo, & Weaver, 1987), unemployment (Feather, 1985). 
Nevertheless, the existing literature does not provide us much information to 
understand to what extent this differentiation of liberals and conservatives in terms of 
dispositional attributions is a result of the differentiation in implicit attributions. In 
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other words, although the findings of various studies suggest that liberals and 
conservatives differ in dispositional attributions (Eidelman, Crandall, Goodman, & 
Blanchar, 2012; Skitka et al., 2002), to our knowledge, there is not yet evidence on 
whether such difference emerges in the early level of information processing or not. 
Also, to our knowledge, there is no previous study which has focused on potential 
ideological differences in making implicit or explicit goal inferences. Still, we suggest 
that even among sentences with no political implication, we should see a processing 
difference in which conservatives infer traits more than goals of the actors whereas 
liberals infer goals more than the traits of the actors.
6
 More specifically, liberals’ 
taking situational factors into consideration should be a critical step in the formation 
of goal inferences, as goals are characterized by actor-situation interactions as 
mentioned above. All in all, ideological factors may work in parallel with people’s 
chronic motivations to engage in one type of inference more than the other.  
 There is also limited amount of research providing support for the effect of 
temporarily activated goals of the perceiver on his/her formation of implicit trait 
inferences from others’ behaviors. Rim, Uleman and Trope (2009) showed that 
inducing a mind-set of high level construal on the perceiver increases his/her 
likelihood of forming STIs. Crawford and his colleagues (2013), on the other hand, 
found that priming approach/avoidance goals through related bodily responses results 
in formation of corresponding (positive/negative) STIs. Rim and her colleagues 
(2013) also showed that when people are primed with affiliation goals, they become 
more likely to form positive STIs. All these research suggests that, both the tendency 
to make implicit inferences as well as the type of inference made might be contingent 
                                                          
6
 However, if the behaviors were politicized or actors were political figures, we would expect a process 
of motivated inference. In this case, it is possible to expect both types of inferences by people of either 
political ideology as long as inferred characteristics can be used to justify the political concerns of the 
perceivers (see Kunda, 1987). 
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on the temporarily activated goals of the perceiver. In the present research, we used a 
social inference goal manipulation procedure as a tool to disentangle trait and goal 
inferences from others’ complex or simple behaviors.  
The Present Research        
 The main aim of the present research is twofold. First, we would like to 
determine the type of information which differentiates people’s tendencies to make 
trait and goal inferences. Actor behaviors that have been used in past social inference 
research (e.g., STI research) have not specified which dimensions should affect the 
type of inferences one could make in significant ways. This lack of information is 
usually compensated for by the perceivers through making assumptions about the 
actor behaviors; experimenters do not know much about such assumptions made by 
their participants if the assumptions are not manipulated or measured in some way 
(Cheng & Novick, 1990). Therefore, it is critical to manipulate the behavioral 
information and analyze the change in the explicit inferences people make for the 
actors described in the sentences. Based on previous research on the implications of 
the specific configurations of consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency dimensions 
of behaviors (Hilton, Smith, & Kim, 1995; McArthur, 1972; Van Overwalle, 1997a, 
1997b), we suggest that it is possible to differentiate behaviors which imply traits 
from behaviors which imply goals of the actors. Specifically, we hypothesized that 
people should be more likely to infer traits from the behaviors with an LLH pattern 
(low consensus, low distinctiveness and high consistency) and goals for the behaviors 
with an LHH (low consensus, high distinctiveness and high consistency) or LLL (low 
consensus, low distinctiveness and low consistency) pattern. Also, people’s 
tendencies to make goal inferences from LHH and LLL behaviors may differ, mainly 
due to the difference in the consistency of the behavior. As LHH behaviors include 
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high consistency, these behaviors may be perceived as implying long-term goals 
whereas LLL behaviors, which include one-time only actions, may be perceived as 
short-term goals. In this sense, LLL behaviors may be less informative about the 
actor’s future actions and therefore may elicit less motivation in the perceiver to make 
an inference. In order to test these hypotheses, in the first two studies we examined 
the likelihood and speed of goal versus trait inferences made from behaviors 
manipulated in terms of the three dimensions of consistency, distinctiveness, and 
consensus. 
 The second aim of the present study is to analyze implicit goal inferences. 
There is an extensive amount of research on the implicit trait inferences. However, 
there is only a handful of research which shows directly that people infer goals of 
others automatically (e.g., Hassin, Aarts, & Ferguson, 2005, Van Overwalle et al., 
2012). This existing research also falls short of differentiating goals from “predicted 
actions” of the actors. We suggest that, while goal inference requires inferring the 
mental state of the actor (who moves toward a desired end-state in a rule-guided 
fashion), the latter is simply about inferring the natural outcomes of the behaviors. In 
the present study, we suggest that people should be able to infer higher level goals of 
others as automatically as traits. Therefore, we tested the automaticity (i.e., 
spontaneity) of goal inferences with a paradigm used in previous STI research. In the 
first two studies, we analyzed the implicit inferences for the behaviors with 
covariation information. In a third study, we focused on behaviors which do not 
provide such information. Specifically, in the third study, we aimed to examine 
people’s tendency to make trait or goal inferences from behaviors that do not provide 
explicit covariance information. Previous research showed that trait inferences are 
very fast and unintentional, however, they did not focus on the possibility that people 
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may be equally likely and fast to infer goals from the same behaviors. In fact, it is 
even possible that the body of evidence purportedly in support of trait inference is 
instead an illustration of goal inference. Such research finds that qualities such as 
“rude”, “kind”, “lazy”, and “generous” are implicitly inferred about an actor, but these 
qualities can be referring to goals just as easily as the assumed reference to traits. 
Therefore, study 3 attempts to clearly dissociate trait and goal inference, allowing for 
a comparison of people’s tendency to infer goals and traits from simple behaviors. It 
also examines the effect of perceivers’ temporarily activated goals on the experience 
of inference-making – whether trait or goal inferences occur.  
Pilot Study: Intentional Inferences for Traits and Goals 
Before starting our studies, we conducted a pilot study in order to select the 
traits and the goals of the actors which will be used as test words in our studies.   
Method 
 Participants. 337 participants (68% female; Mage  = 36.18, SDage  = 12.75) 
were recruited and tested through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. They received $1 for 
their participation in a study which took 25-30 minutes in total. 
Materials and Procedure. Participants received behavior sentences of 
different actors and were asked to write about 1) what the given behavior makes them 
think the person is like 2) what goal they believe the person has (what he/she is trying 
to do) (by filling out sentences starting with the phrases of “He is…” and “His goal 
is…” in a semi-structured format). These behavior sentences have been used many 
times in STI research (e.g., Uleman, Hon, Roman, & Moskowitz, 1996), yet, for the 
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purpose of this study, we integrated consensus, distinctiveness and consistency 
information into each behavior.
7
 
 These sentences were specifically manipulated in terms of these three 
dimensions with an aim of generating LHH, LLH and LLL configurations (see 
Appendix A for the complete list of items). Thus, 37 behaviors, each expressed in an 
LHH, LLH, and LLL configuration were finalized. Three stimulus sets of the 
sentences were created with each set of sentences containing equal representation of 
each configuration type. Participants randomly received one of these three versions of 
each of the 37 behaviors. After the phase of behavior judgment, they answered some 
demographic questions about their gender, occupation, education, English 
proficiency, age, ethnicity and ideology. Lastly, they received a debriefing about the 
general purpose of the study.   
Results 
First, we constructed categories of the expressed traits and goals for each 
behavior. For example, for the behavior “She dusted and vacuumed her home office 
every day. She does not do this to other rooms in her home. Nobody else dusts or 
vacuums their office every day”, the expressed traits (and constructed categories) 
were “clean, neat/tidy/organized, OCD, focused/work-oriented, concerned” and 
“allergic”; and the expressed goals were “to be clean” and “to appear clean”. For each 
category a frequency count was performed, and we selected the most frequently 
verbalized traits and goals (e.g., clean as the trait and to be clean as the goal) for 
further analyses (in which we used implicit measures of inference). In 18 of the 37 
                                                          
7
 This covariance information appeared with the same order (consistency, distinctiveness and 
consensus) in all sentences. The logic was to keep the first sentence (which mostly included the 
consistency information anyway) close to the original sentences used in the previous STI studies as 
much as possible. We decided to leave the consensus information to the end as it was the least critical 
dimension for the purpose of the present study (as low consensus was preserved in all sentences, the 
possibility of decreased attention at the end of the behaviors would disturb the effect of this dimension 
the least among the three covariance dimensions).   
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behaviors, participants provided similar concepts as goals and traits for all three 
versions of the behaviors (with LHH, LLH and LLL configurations; see Appendix A 
for these behaviors specified with an asterisk).  These behaviors were used in Study 1 
and Study 2.  
Study 1. Implicit Inferences for Traits and Goals: Goal Manipulation 
Previous research showed that people tend to infer traits of actors from their 
single behaviors in a mostly unintentional and fast fashion (Carlston & Skowronski, 
1994; Todorov & Uleman, 2002; Uleman, Newman, & Moskowitz, 1996). There is 
also a limited amount of research showing that people can infer actor goals and 
intentions even faster than actor traits (Hassin, Aarts and Ferguson, 2005; Malle & 
Holbrook, 2012; Van Overwalle et al., 2012). However, these studies either focused 
on behaviors which imply either traits or goals of the actor (Malle & Holbrook, 2012) 
(i.e., they did not determine the conditions in which a behavior could imply both a 
trait and a goal) or compared the tendency to make goal or trait inference for the same 
behavior but by focusing on predictable actions rather than high-level goals of the 
actors (Hassin, Aarts and Ferguson, 2005; Van Overwalle et al., 2012). In other 
words, they compared people’s responses to the words defining the action that is 
supposed to follow the actor’s behavior (e.g., swim) with their responses to the words 
defining the trait of the actor (e.g. athletic). What was not clear in these studies is, 
whether these “trait words” actually map on to the trait concept which was defined 
previously; a personality characteristic which is assumed to be consistent across 
situation and time. Our pilot study reviewed above showed that, people often tend to 
use the same words or word clusters to define actor goals and traits. All things 
considered, our concern here was to understand, 1) when do people tend to infer actor 
goals rather than traits for the same behaviors by comparing three different 
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information configurations in actor behaviors (LHH, LLH, LLL), and 2) whether 
people infer traits or goals of the actor when they use the same word linguistically for 
inferring traits and goals (e.g., an honest type vs. trying to be honest).  
If behaviors with LHH and LLL configurations imply goals while those with 
LLH imply traits, we hypothesized that manipulation of the goal of making goal vs. 
trait inferences should differentially affect inferences from these behaviors. Previous 
research showed that inferential goals can be manipulated both explicitly and 
implicitly. Krull (1993), for example manipulated inferential goals of the perceivers in 
an explicit fashion (by making them focus on certain aspects of the given behavior) 
and such a manipulation affected the type of social inference (dispositional vs. 
situational) people engaged in. Chartrand and Bargh (1996), on the other hand, 
demonstrated that inferential goals can be manipulated implicitly, namely, as a part of 
an independent task and by being outside of the perceivers’ awareness. In the present 
research, we employed a relatively implicit procedure (in the sense that it was part of 
an independent task) to manipulate people’s inferential goals in order to capture 
different tendencies to make inferences from behaviors with different configurations.   
Specifically, we suggest that manipulation of inferential goals should affect 
the type of inference participants make when processing a behavior presented in a 
sentence. Inference is assessed by whether participants falsely remember having seen 
the concepts implied by the behaviors (since the concepts are not actually presented as 
part of the behavior, merely implied). Also, this manipulation should differentially 
affect the confidence in correctly rejecting a concept as having not been in the 
sentence, which would be characterized by response time. More specifically, there 
were three goal conditions comprising the goal manipulation. Some participants 
performed a first task in which they were trained to make goal inferences, and this 
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goal of inferring goals was hypothesized to remain accessible and impact the 
subsequent processing of the stimulus sentences. This goal was hypothesized to 
trigger inferences from LHH and LLL behaviors (that would be characterized by 
higher false recognitions and/or slower correct rejections for the implied concepts) to 
a greater degree than LLH behaviors.  Another group of participants performed a first 
task in which they were trained to make trait inferences, and this goal of inferring 
traits was hypothesized to remain accessible and impact the subsequent processing of 
the stimulus sentences. This goal was hypothesized to trigger inferences from LLH 
behaviors.       
Method 
Participants. 93 undergraduate university students (61 females, Mage= 19.02, 
SDage= 1.23) from Lehigh University were recruited and tested in the lab. They 
received course credit in return for their participation. 
Materials and Procedure. 
Goal manipulation. After arriving to the lab, participants were first exposed to 
a goal or trait inference manipulation (or control condition). In both goal manipulation 
conditions (goal of inferring goals versus goal of inferring traits), they worked on a 
set of behaviors which were found to imply both goals and traits of the actors in a 
previous study (van Overwalle et al., 2012; see Appendix B). Their task in this phase 
was to either infer traits, goals or other characteristics of the actors (e.g., gender, 
occupation) from given behaviors. 
 This manipulation was administered through a computer task similar to the 
one used by Malle and Holbrook (2012) in order to measure different social 
inferences. The task (as well as the following probe-recognition task) was 
programmed through E-Prime software (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002). 
36 
 
Specifically, participants saw each behavior sentence for 5000 ms on the screen 
followed by a probe for certain inferences such as GOAL?, TRAIT?, GENDER?, 
OCCUPATION?. The probe stayed on the screen until the response was registered. 
Participants were asked to respond as quickly as possible if they think that they can 
make the inference probed by the cue from this sentence or not by pressing a Yes 
(“A” or “L”) or No (“L” or “A”) key. If they answered Yes, they saw an instruction of 
“what GOAL (TRAIT) was revealed” on the screen and were also asked to type in 
their specific inference.  
Importantly, in the goal inference manipulation condition, in most of the trials 
(10/16) participants were asked whether they can infer a goal from the behavior they 
saw previously. In the trait inference manipulation condition they mostly (10/16) 
responded to the question of whether they can infer a trait from the behavior. In both 
conditions, the remaining trials (6/16) asked about inferences for characteristics other 
than goals and traits, namely gender and occupation. In the control condition, 
participants were asked to respond to trait and goal inference questions in equal 
numbers (5/16 each) as well as other characteristics of the actors.   
Probe-Recognition Task.  Following the goal manipulation, participants 
engaged in a probe recognition task in which implicit inferences were measured. 
Participants in all goal manipulation conditions went through the same procedure in 
this phase, except for a subliminal priming manipulation. In order to make sure that 
the effect of the goal manipulation did not wear off quickly, we subliminally primed 
the concept they should focus on in between the trials in this phase. So in the goal 
inference goal condition, participants were primed with the word GOAL and in the 
trait inference goal condition, they were primed with the word TRAIT for 15 ms. In 
the control condition, a series of Xs (XXXX) were shown for 15 ms instead.  
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In this phase, participants were told that they will engage in an independent 
memory task. Specifically, they would learn about a behavior and after each behavior, 
they would be shown a word. Their task was to remember if that specific word was in 
the behavior that immediately preceded it, or not. The behaviors (selected from the 
pilot study mentioned above) appeared on the screen for 10 seconds each. Following 
each sentence, they saw a word on the screen which may imply both a goal and a trait 
conceptually (as observed in the pilot study). Participants’ task was to answer if they 
remember having seen the word in the previous sentence or not, by pressing the 
assigned Yes (“A” or “L”) or No (“L” or “A”) buttons as quickly as possible.8  
Our behavior list included 12 type of behaviors
9
  with 3 configurations of 
consensus, consistency and distinctiveness information (i.e., LHH, LLH, LLL) for 
each behavior. Each participant saw 12 behaviors with one of these 3 configurations. 
In order to make sure that people see only one of these configurations for each 
behavior as well as they see an equal number of different combinations in total (4 
behaviors for each configuration of LHH, LLH or LLL), we created 3 different lists 
and randomly assigned participants to see one of these lists (see Appendix C). In the 
end, each participant saw 12 behaviors which imply (but does not include) the 
following word and 8 behaviors (controls) which include the word. The main focus of 
analyses was the implied behavior sentences so the role of the control behaviors was 
to ensure the participants that these words do sometimes actually appear on the screen 
and to check if participants attended to the stimuli or not.  
                                                          
8
 The keys which were assigned for Yes and No responses stayed the same throughout the task, 
meaning that, if the participant used the “A” key to respond as Yes in the training session, s/he used the 
“A” key to respond as Yes (I saw the word) in the memory task as well. 
9
 The pilot study with 37 behaviors showed that people tend use similar words to describe traits and 
goals in 18 of these behaviors. However, 4 of these trait/goals (safe, honest, generous, helpful) were 
commonly used in 2 or 3 different behaviors. Therefore, we ended up having 13 behaviors implying 
independent goals/traits from one another.  
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Measures of Individual Difference. In order to explore possible differences in 
the tendency to make implicit inferences, after the false recognition task, we asked 
participants to fill out a survey on Qualtrics. This survey included measures of Need 
for Cognition (NC; Cacioppo et al., 1984), Personal Need for Structure (PNS; 
Neuberg & Newsom, 1993)
10
 as well as demographics.  
Design. A 3 (goal manipulation: goal, trait, control) x 3 (behavior 
configuration: LHH, LLH, LLL) x 3 (behavior list) x 2 (key: A= yes, L= no; L= yes, 
A= no) mixed design was administered. The last two factors were added for the 
purpose of controlling for possible list and key effects on responses. All factors were 
between-subjects except for the information configuration.  
Results 
False Recognition. The overall accuracy of recognition for both critical and 
control trials was quite high (the error ratios for each behavior type; MLHH= .13, 
SDLHH= .21; MLLH= .17, SDLLH= .25; MLLL= .15, SDLLL= .24; Mfiller= .20, SDfiller= .23) 
(see Figure 1)
11
.  A 3 x 3 mixed factorial ANOVA was conducted to analyze the 
effect of goal manipulation and behavior configuration on false recognition. There 
was not a main effect of behavior on false recognition, meaning that, overall, people 
were equally likely to falsely recognize words in different behavior configurations, 
F(2,180) = 1.69, p=.19,p
2
 =.02. There was also not a significant main effect of goal 
manipulation on false recognition, F(2,90) = .02, p =.98, p
2
 =.001, showing that 
making people think of traits, goals or both did not affect their overall performance in 
                                                          
10
 Previous research indicated some individual differences in terms of STI. Specifically, Moskowitz 
(1993) found that, people with high PNS are more likely to engage in STIs compared to low PNS 
people. Based on that, we included this and some relevant measures in our procedure, in order to 
explore potential differences in the tendencies to make implicit goal and trait inferences.  
11
 Uleman and his colleagues (1996) mentioned that, in the probe recognition paradigm, it is possible to 
expect differences either in terms of accuracy or RT. They suggest that whether the effect will be 
observed in accuracy or RT depends on the specific strategy participants engaged in while responding. 
Participants’ overall high accuracy here suggests that they prioritized correct responses at the expense 
of RT during this task. In this case, it may be more reasonable to rely on differences in RT for the 
hypothesis testing.    
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the memory task. Importantly, the interaction of behavior configuration and goal 
manipulation was also not significant, F(4,180) = 1.56, p=.19, p
2
 =.03. In other 
words, being in a certain goal manipulation condition did not affect people’s tendency 
to falsely recognize goal/trait implying words differentially for different behavior 
configurations. When the list type was entered as a covariate into this analysis, it did 
not change the results in significant ways (the nonsignificant findings for the 
interaction of goal manipulation and behavior configuration on false recognition were 
similar across different list conditions; F(8, 168) = 1.12, p=.35, p
2
= .05).  
Still, an interesting pattern of results were observed for LHH and LLL 
behaviors. Contrary to expectations that these two types of configurations would yield 
similar patterns in terms of false recognition after the goal inference goal 
manipulation, the patterns turned out to be almost the opposite for these two types of 
behavior configurations, as displayed in Figure 1. While in the goal inference goal 
condition, people were more likely to make false recognitions for LLL (M=.19, 
SD=.27) than LHH (M=.11, SD=.22) behaviors, in the control condition where people 
were asked to think about both goal and trait inferences, the opposite pattern was 
observed (LLL: M=.11, SD=.19; LHH:  M=.16, SD=.20). In order to further analyze 
this pattern, we reran the mixed factorial ANOVA by dropping LLH behaviors. This 
analysis yielded a significant interaction between goal manipulation and 
configuration, F(2, 90) = 3.06, p= .05, p
2
= .06. The interaction was characterized by 
marginally different false recognition for LHH and LLL behaviors under the goal 
inference goal condition. Participants were more likely to falsely recognize words 
when they saw LLL behaviors compared to LHH behaviors when they were in the 
goal inference goal condition, F(1, 90) = 3.73, p=.06, p
2
 =.04. None of the other 
effects were significant. Also, none of the individual difference variables (PNS, NC, 
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and ideology) had any effect on false recognition when they were added to the 3 x 3 
ANOVA as a covariate.  
Considering the advantage of mixed effect models in procedures where 
variability both within participants and within stimuli can be accounted as random 
factors (Judd, Westfall, & Kenny, 2012), we also conducted a general linear mixed 
model analysis  using the GLIMMIX procedure in SAS by entering subject intercept 
as a random factor and using the binary response accuracy (1= correct, 0= incorrect) 
for each specific critical behavior as the dependent variable in our model.
12
 The 
solutions for the fixed effects of goal manipulation and behavior configuration 
showed similar results, neither the main effect of goal manipulation, F(2,1017) = .03, 
p=.97, nor the main effect of behavior configuration, F(2,1017) = 1.78, p=.17 was 
significant. The interaction was also not significant, F(2,1017) = 1.56, p=.18. 
Consistent with the mixed factorial ANOVA, the solutions for the fixed effects 
indicated a significant difference of false recognition  in LHH and LLL sentences 
across goal inference goal vs. control conditions, t(1017)=  2.29, p= .02. Tukey-
adjusted simple effect comparisons failed to show any significant difference between 
LHH and LLL within the goal inference goal condition t(1017)= 1.88, p= .14.  
RTs. Participants received 1116 trials in which they were asked about a 
trait/goal word that was implied by (but not included in) the sentence and they 
rejected 947 of these trials (85%) in total. Among these correct rejections, an outlier 
analysis revealed 27 (1.7 %) data points in which participants’ responses were 3SD 
above the mean RT.  These data points were dropped and average RTs for each 
                                                          
12
 All proc glimmix analyses in all three studies in the present research were conducted with 3 other 
alternative models as well. In these models, the fixed factors were kept constant while random 
variables were entered as 1) subject intercept and stimuli intercept, 2) subject intercept and behavior 
type slope 3) subject intercept and condition slope. In all the analyses, the model reported above 
(subject intercept only as a random factor) provided the best fit (in this model Gen Chi-Square/DF ratio 
was closer to 1 compared to other models and we took that as a standard as suggested by Barbu, 2012).  
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behavior configuration were recalculated. As 2 participant’s responses to all LLH and 
1 participant’s to all LLL behaviors were 3 SD above the mean, these two participants 
were excluded and 90 participants were included in the RT analyses.  
In order to analyze the effect of goal manipulation and behavior configuration 
on RT for correct rejections, A 3 x 3 mixed factorial ANOVA was conducted (see 
Figure 2). The main effect of behavior type turned out to be nonsignificant, F(2, 174) 
= .62, p=.54, p
2
 =.007. Namely, people were equally fast in correctly rejecting the 
implied goal/trait words across different types of behavior configurations. Main effect 
of goal manipulation was also not significant, F(2, 87) = 2.22, p= .11, p
2
 =.05, 
showing that people were equally fast at correctly rejecting critical words in different 
goal manipulation conditions.  
Contrary to our expectation, RTs in correctly rejecting words in behaviors with 
different configurations did not differ across different goal manipulation conditions, 
as the interaction was also not significant, F(4, 174) = .63, p= .64, p
2
 =.01. When the 
effect of different list conditions (that were administered for counterbalancing 
purposes) was controlled by entering this factor as a covariate into the analysis, the 
results did not change in significant ways. Moreover, when the effects of individual 
difference variables (i.e., PNS, NC, and political ideology) were analyzed as 
covariates, none of these variables made any remarkable changes in the results as 
well.   
Importantly, ANOVA deals with missing values by eliminating these 
participants from the analysis completely. As this RT analysis relies on correct 
rejections only, it becomes especially likely to lose data due to a participant’s lacking 
correct rejections for one type of behavior configuration only. In this case it is 
especially critical to conduct a PROC MIXED analysis on SAS with a long data 
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format to be able to use all RT data available. Moreover, it is quite likely to see 
variability across subjects in terms of RT; some participants’ overall RTs may be 
shorter /longer than others for different reasons. We were able to account for this 
variability in this analysis by including a participant-level random intercept in the 
model.
13
 Goal manipulation, behavior configuration and the interaction of these two 
factors were entered as fixed factors predicting the response time as in ANOVA.  
The covariance parameter estimates revealed a significant effect of 
participants showing a significant variability in RTs across different participants, 
z=5.17, p< .0001. When this variability was accounted for, the results for the fixed 
effects remained the same with the ANOVA. RTs did not differ across responses for 
behaviors with different configurations, F(2, 832) = .26, p=.71. RTs also did not differ 
across three goal manipulation conditions, F(2, 832) = 2.35, p=.10. The interaction 
between configuration type and condition was also found to be not significant, F(4, 
832) = .49, p=.74 
Discussion 
 This experiment did not reveal any support for the hypothesis that people tend 
to make inferences for LHH and LLL behaviors under a goal inference goal, and they 
also failed to make inferences for LLH behaviors under a trait inference goal. Still, 
there was an interesting pattern for LLL and LHH behaviors, such that, people tended 
to make more false recognitions for LLL behaviors than LHH behaviors under the 
goal inference goal. This was contrary to expectations as we suggested that both LHH 
                                                          
13
 Considering that some behavior sentences may elicit shorter/longer RTs than others and following 
Judd, Westfall and Kenny’s (2012) suggestions , the intercept for the stimuli was also included with 
participant intercept as random factors in another model (all 36 behavior sentences were entered as 
unique stimuli into the data in this analysis). This model provided a poorer fit (characterized by a 
higher AIC value) than the reported model. In a different model, the slope for the condition effect 
(which may potentially vary across participants) was also considered as a random factor. This strategy 
also did not improve the reported model.  
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and LLL behaviors should imply goals. This finding suggests that, even if both LHH 
and LLL behaviors might imply goals (although not captured in this study), these 
goals should differ in quality (such as the level of abstractness or strength). Further 
studies should focus on these possibilities.  
 One limitation of this study was not having appropriate control trials in the 
probe recognition task, in other words, a baseline measure of people’s tendency of 
correctly rejecting having seen a word that was not implied by the behavior. Instead 
of a baseline measure, our analyses relied on a relative tendency to make false 
recognitions or slowing down in correct rejections for goal/trait implying words 
across different goal manipulation conditions. In the following studies, we added 
these control trials into the paradigms we used. Another limitation (or artifact) of this 
study was the control condition for the goal manipulation. In order to control for the 
effect of having a goal of making goal or trait inferences only, we made participants 
think of both goals and traits in the control condition. Although this manipulation 
would be strong to catch inferences for clearly dissociable concepts (e.g., situation vs. 
disposition attributions), it may not create an appropriate framework to differentiate 
concepts that can easily trigger one another, such as goals and traits. The results of 
this study became hard to interpret in this sense. Possibly, this control condition may 
have facilitated both goal and trait inferences equally, trait inferences mostly or goal 
inferences mostly, depending on either people’s tendencies to engage in these 
inferences or some differential qualities of these inferences (e.g., if thinking of traits is 
a stronger manipulation than goals, people may have even started to interpret the 
goals of the actors in terms of traits or vice versa). In this sense, this condition may 
have actually created an additive effect of goal and trait inferences, instead of creating 
a neutral condition compared to other goal manipulation conditions. Such possibility 
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is supported by a general slowdown of responses under this control condition 
(although not significant).  
 Taking these concerns into consideration, in the second experiment, we 
administered a more fine-grained measure (i.e., probe recognition with categorization 
task) to capture goal vs. trait inferences for behaviors with LHH, LLH and LLL 
configurations.  
Study 2. Implicit Inferences for Traits and Goals: Categorization Task 
In the first experiment participants held implicit goals to infer either traits or 
goals, and we examined if this differentially facilitated their likelihood of forming 
inferences from behavioral stimuli that differed in how strongly they implied traits 
versus goals. This approach to dissociating goal and trait inference was not successful. 
Another way to determine whether perceivers implicitly refer to the characteristics of 
others in terms of a goal vs. a trait is to shift from examining goals to instead 
examining response tendencies. When explicit trait inference is trained to be 
associated with a particular response (pulling a lever toward the self, pressing a 
particular button, etc.), then if an implicit inference requires the same response it 
should be facilitated if the inference is also referencing a trait, but we should see no 
facilitation if it is some other type of inference (such as a goal). In this experiment we 
analyzed the impact of a specific behavioral response in a forced categorization task 
(goal vs. trait) to see if it facilitated (vs. interfered with) subsequent inference-making 
on a task assessing implicit inferences that called for a similar behavioral response as 
that used in the forced categorization task. Once again, a probe recognition task 
served as the measure of implicit inference, with pressing buttons marked “yes” and 
“no” to indicate of the probe word had been in the sentence serving as the behavioral 
response in question. 
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According to embodiment theory, cognitive processing of certain stimuli 
should be facilitated by related/associated bodily actions (Niedenthal et al., 2005). If 
this is the case, then it should be possible to associate certain body responses (e.g., 
responding with one hand or the other) with certain categories (traits vs. goals) and 
then to expect these body responses to either facilitate or hinder related responses. 
The implicit association test (Greenwald et al., 1998) makes use of this logic. When 
people use the left hand to indicate they have seen a positive word (e.g., flower) it is 
easier for them to use the same hand to make an inference about category membership 
if the category shares a positive valence (e.g., a name that indicates the category 
“white”) relative to using that hand to categorize an item with negative valence (e.g., 
a name that indicates the category “black”). Such use of response tendencies allows us 
to infer that if an inhibited response time is observed it indicates an implicit 
association between the category “black” and negative affect. Facilitated times 
indicate an implicit association between the category “white” and positive affect. Can 
such logic be applied to examining whether people implicitly associate a trait or a 
goal with a behavior?  
For example, suppose that people automatically infer a goal when they read 
about an actor’s behavior. In this case, previous body responses associated with the 
category of goal -such as responding with left hand - should facilitate their goal 
detection with a correspondent body response – by using the left hand. Another way 
to think of it is that a response switch (responding with left hand for the goal category 
but making a response to a goal implying sentence with the right hand) should be 
costly to the participant as it requires an extra cognitive step of the suppression of an 
automatic response (to respond to goal words with the left hand). Using this 
theoretical framework, in this study we utilized bodily states’ facilitation/interference 
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of cognitive processing and response to associated concepts in order to examine our 
questions of how information relating to consistency, consensus, and distinctiveness 
impacts the type of inference people form.   
Specifically, we predicted that, when participants use the same hand (i.e., key) 
to respond to “goal” categories in the categorization task and to respond with “Yes” 
(admitting having seen the word) in a subsequent memory task that assesses inference 
formation, their inference type can be identified. If they are slower to correctly reject 
having seen the word by making a response switch (i.e., disengaging attention from 
Goal/Yes response) to press the No key, then it suggests they have made a goal 
inference from the sentence. If sentences with LHH and LLL configurations imply 
goals rather than traits, this cost in RT should be observed for these behaviors 
specifically.  On the other hand, when a “Yes” response is paired with a key press that 
matches with the key press for indicating a “trait” category, a cost for response switch 
should be observed only if the person had inferred a trait. If our prediction about 
implicit trait inference for sentences with LLH configurations is correct, this cost 
should be observed for these sentences only.  
Based on the previous research showing high accuracy overall in a probe 
recognition task (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986; Uleman et al., 1996), it may not be 
possible to observe enough variation in accuracy to capture potential differences for 
different behavior configurations.
14
 Still, if enough variation in accuracy is captured, 
higher false recognition rates should be observed for LHH and LLL sentences when 
the goal key (on the explicit categorization task) and the yes key (on the implicit 
inference task) match due to the facilitation of yes responses as a result of implicitly 
                                                          
14
 We used probe recognition paradigm instead of other paradigms (e.g., cued recall, false recognition) 
that elicit more variation in accuracy mainly because of the complexity of sentences. More specifically, 
it was possible to observe a floor effect in terms of accurately remembering these complex sentences if 
we used other paradigms that require recall or recognition of critical words after the exposure of all 
behaviors.  
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inferring a goal. For the LLH sentences, on the other hand, false recognition rates 
should be higher in the condition where trait and yes keys match. 
Method 
Participants. 79 Lehigh University students from an introductory psychology 
course (2 with missing demographic information, 33 females, Mage= 18.93, SDage= 
1.02) were recruited to participate in a 20 minute study in a lab. They received partial 
credit toward their introduction to psychology course in return for their participation. 
Materials and Procedure.  
Training Session. In the first part of the study, participants engaged in a 
training session in which they learned to associate certain buttons (and, thus, using a 
certain hand) with the categories of goal and trait. Participants were shown 20 simple 
goal-implying or trait-implying sentences that were previously used to analyze goal 
and trait inferences by van Overwalle et al. (2012). These sentences were different 
from the ones used in Study 1 in the sense that they were shown to be either goal or 
trait implying by these scholars; no sentence implied both a goal and a trait by relying 
on the same concept for both (Appendix D). Although we think that most of the goal-
implying behaviors they used imply very low level goals (to swim, to play, etc.) as 
discussed before, for the purpose of this training (category-response association), the 
sentences and inferences needed to be overly simple, so as not to interfere with the 
social inferences we measure in the experimental phase that followed. 
The study was completely computerized and programmed using E-Prime 
software. In this first phase, participants received an instruction explaining the 
“categorization task” they would engage in. Specifically, they were asked to press a 
certain button (A or L) if they think the behavior on the screen implies a goal and to 
press another button (L or A) if they think this behavior implies a trait of the actor 
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(the assigned buttons were counterbalanced between participants). Also, after each 
response, participants saw a box on the screen asking about the specific goal/trait (the 
wording was matched with the participant’s answer) that was implied by the behavior. 
This procedure aimed to make participants think deeper about their categorization 
responses.  
Probe Recognition Task with Repeated Categorization. Following the 
training session (i.e., categorization task), participants were told that we are interested 
in people’s dual-task capabilities, namely their performance in a memory task when 
they engage in an independent categorization task at the same time. So in this task, 
participants saw behaviors with LHH, LLH and LLL configurations (the same 
behaviors used in the previous study) but this time with pictures of the actors 
engaging in the behaviors. Sentences and pictures were presented simultaneously on a 
black background. Pictures included actor faces with a neutral expression on a plain 
background.  After each behavior-picture pair that was presented for 10 seconds, a 
different behavior sentence that was shown in the categorization task appeared on the 
screen and participants were asked to make the same categorization they previously 
made by using the same assigned keys. The participants were reminded of the 
assigned keys by the cues which stayed on the screen until the response is made. So 
for example, if the “A” key was assigned for responding a goal category and the “L” 
key was assigned for responding a trait category, a “goal” cue appeared at the left top 
corner of the screen and a “trait” cue appeared at the right top corner of the screen 
(i.e., the cue location on the screen corresponded to the required hand to respond). 
Also, during categorization, the background color of the screen was changed into 
white (and it was changed back into black in the memory task) to make it easier for 
the participants to distinguish categorization and memory tasks. After categorization, 
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participants saw a word along with the actor’s picture that they saw 2-slides-back. 
They were asked to answer as quickly as possible if they remember having seen this 
word in this actor’s behavior or not. The word they saw was either implied by but not 
included in the behavior (critical trials), was not implied by and not included in the 
behavior (control) or was actually included in the behavior (filler). The same buttons 
with the categorization task (A and L) were used to make yes and no responses. In the 
goal-yes match condition, participants used the same button they used in categorizing 
goals (in the categorization task) to say Yes (I saw the word). In the trait-yes match 
condition, they used the same key they used in categorizing traits to say Yes. Goal-
Yes and Trait-Yes conditions were manipulated within subjects in two blocks. 
Specifically, participants used the same keys for categorization throughout the task 
but Yes-No buttons were switched in the second block. So for example, if participants 
used the same key to respond with “goal” and “yes” (I saw the word) in the first 
block, they switched the “yes” key in the second block so that it matched with a 
“trait” response this time.  
 As this was a more demanding task than the one used in the first study, 
participants engaged in 4 practice trials in which they were also walked through every 
step of the task with explanations (Slide 1: Behavior 1: Memorize the behavior with 
this face; Slide 2: Behavior 2: Categorize that; Slide 3: Was this word included in the 
first behavior?). In two of these practice trials the correct answer was yes and in the 
other two the correct answer was no. Participants also received feedback for their 
responses in this practice phase.  
 For this probe recognition (memory/inference) task, we used the same 
behavior list as in Study 1. Again, for the critical trials, participants were randomly 
assigned to one of the 3 lists that were created by selecting one of the three 
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configurations for each of the 12 behaviors.  Thus, the task consisted of 12 critical 
trials with 4 LHH, 4 LLH and 4 LLL behaviors (implying but not actually including 
the word being asked). In addition, there were 4 control trials (not including or 
implying the word being asked) and 8 filler trials (including the word being asked) 
adding up to 24 trials. For each individual, half of each type of the behaviors were 
randomly selected and shown in the first block and the other half were shown in the 
second block. Which picture would be matched with a certain behavior was 
individually randomized (male pictures were randomized within behaviors initiated 
by males and vice versa). Other than that, both the order of memory behaviors and 
categorization behaviors were individually randomized.  
After this task, participants were asked to recall as many sentences as possible 
that they were asked to memorize. This procedure was administered to check for 
people’s tendency to integrate implied trait/goal words into the recalled behaviors.  
 Measures of Individual Difference. The same individual differences measures 
from Study 1 were employed. This time, however, the survey was programmed on E-
Prime (instead of Qualtrics). 
Design. A 4 (behavior configuration: LHH, LLH, LLL, Control) x 2 (match 
type: goal-yes match, trait-yes match) x 2 (categorization key: goal A, trait L; goal L, 
trait A) x 3 (behavior list) within-subjects design was administered with the last two 
factors being between-subjects counterbalancing conditions.  
 
Results 
False Recognition. A 2 x 4 repeated measures ANOVA was conducted in 
order to analyze people’s tendency to falsely recognize the words implied in the 
critical sentences across different key match conditions (see Figure 3). The analysis 
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yielded a main effect of behavior configuration, F(3, 234) = 16.65, p< .001, p
2
 =.18, 
characterized by significantly less false recognitions for control trials in which the 
word being asked was not implied by the behavior (M=.03, SD=.15)  compared to 
LHH (M= .18, SD=.31), LLH (M=.20, SD=.34) and LLL (M= .17, SD= .32) behavior 
in which the word being asked was implied, ps< .001 (Bonferroni corrected). As can 
be observed from the mean false recognitions, participants’ accuracy was quite high 
overall.  
The main effect of match type was not significant, F(1, 78) = .30, p=.58, p
2
 
=.004, indicating that overall accuracy did not differ across the two match type 
conditions (i.e., switching the key did not make participants less accurate in the 
second block). Importantly though, the interaction between the match type and 
behavior configuration also did not turn out to be significant, F(3, 234) = .30, p=.82, 
p
2
 =.004. This result may stem from restricted variability (in these highly accurate 
responses) to be able to observe more/less false recognitions as a function of a key 
match between the yes response and goal/trait category response.  
When the list type was added as a between-subjects variable into this 2 x 4 
ANOVA, an interaction between behavior configuration and list emerged, F(6,228)= 
3.02, p=.007, p
2
 =.07. Further simple effect analyses with Bonferroni correction 
showed that this interaction stems from higher false recognition for the LLL behaviors 
in List 2 (M=.26, SD=.37) than List 1 (M=.08, SD=.25), p=.03. However, the three-
way interaction between configuration, match type condition and list type did not turn 
out to be significant F(6,228)= .53, p=.79, p
2
 =.02. None of the other main effects or 
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interactions were found to be significant. When individual difference variables were 
controlled as possible covariates, results stayed the same as well.
15
 
In addition, a PROC GLIMMIX analysis was conducted in SAS with the long 
data where accuracy for each response (instead of the average of responses within 
each behavior type) were entered into the datasheet in a binary format (1= correct, 0= 
incorrect). As in the analysis for the Study 1, subject intercept was entered as the 
random variable into the model. The solutions for the fixed effects were consistent 
with the ANOVA. The only significant effect was the main effect of behavior 
configuration, F(3, 1173) = 13.82, p<.001, which stemmed from higher accuracy for 
control compared to critical trials. Neither the main effect of match type nor the 
interaction between behavior configuration was significant, Fs<1.  
RTs. Participants responded to 948 trait/goal implying trials in total and 775 
of these trials (82%) were correctly rejected. On the other hand, among 316 control 
trials, 306 were correctly rejected (97%). Among all correct rejections, an outlier 
analysis revealed 26 (2.06 %) data points in which participants’ RTs were 3SD above 
the mean RT. Also, one participant’s response time did not seem to indicate that the 
participant had processed the word (14ms). These data points were dropped and 
average RTs for each behavior configuration were recalculated.  
A 2 x 4 repeated measures ANOVA was conducted in order to compare the 
RTs for correct rejections among different match type conditions and behavior types 
(see Figure 4). Again as expected, match type condition did not indicate a main effect, 
                                                          
15
 When PNS was added as a categorical variable (high vs. low) into this analysis, a marginally 
significant three-way interaction between PNS, match type and behavior configuration emerged, 
F(3,225)= 2.56, p=.06, p
2
 =.03. This interaction was characterized by differential performance of high 
PNS people in the goal-yes key match condition. Participants’ false recognitions were significantly 
greater for all three types of behavior configurations compared to control behaviors in both low PNS 
people and high PNS people when they responded in the trait-yes match type condition, ps<.05. 
However, false recognitions did not differ across these critical and control behaviors when high PNS 
people used the goal keys to respond.  
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F(1, 57)=.00, p=.99.  Still, a significant main effect of behavior configuration 
emerged, F(3, 171)=3.61, p=.02. Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni correction 
showed that this main effect was characterized by faster responses to control trials 
(M= 1480.85, SD= 460.62) compared to LHH (M= 1608.55, SD=536.21), p=.06, and 
LLL (M= 1640.65, SD=512.72) behaviors, p=03, (and not to LLH (M=1582.38, 
SD=536.04) behaviors). There were no significant RT differences across critical trials.  
Importantly, a significant interaction between match type and behavior type 
was observed, F(3, 171)= 3.51, p= .02, p
2
 =.06. Pairwise analyses showed that, as 
expected, in the goal-yes match type condition, participants were significantly slower 
for correctly rejecting the implied words in LLL behaviors compared to the words in 
control behaviors, p=.002. This difference in response latency for critical compared to 
control behaviors in the goal-yes match type condition indicates a goal inference. 
Another significant effect emerged when RTs for LLL behaviors across goal-yes and 
trait-yes conditions were compared, p=.03, showing that participants were faster at 
correctly rejecting the implied words in LLL sentences in trait-yes condition 
compared to goal-yes condition. Interestingly, an opposite pattern was observed for 
the LHH behaviors. Although the RTs for correct rejections of the implied words in 
LHH and control behaviors did not differ in goal-yes match or trait-yes match 
conditions (indicating no goal or trait inference), ps> .1, correct rejections for LHH 
behaviors were almost slower when the yes key was matched with trait response than 
with goal response, p=08.
16
 On the other hand, RTs of correct rejections of the 
implied words in LLH behaviors did not differ from RTs of correct rejections of the 
words in control behaviors, both in goal-yes and trait-yes match conditions, again 
                                                          
16
 All the analyses reported were also conducted by eliminating 4 participants whose performance in 
the categorization task was below chance level. The significant differences became more pronounced 
and RT difference for LHH behaviors across 2 key match conditions became significant, p=.04. Also 
conducting log transformation for the RTs did not change the results in any way.  
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indicating no goal or trait inference (p=1 and p=.1 respectively). The effects stayed 
the same across different list conditions (three-way interaction between the key 
match, behavior type and list was not significant: F(6,165)=  .32, p=.92, p
2
 =.01). 
When the variables measuring individual differences (i.e., ideology, PNS and 
NC) that can potentially affect the tendency to make implicit inferences were added as 
covariates into this 2 x 4 repeated measures ANOVA, an interesting effect of political 
ideology was observed. The significant interaction between the behavior type and 
match type turned out to be nonsignificant when the effect of ideology was controlled 
for, F(3,162)=  1. 19, p=.32, p
2
 =.02.
17
 When the analysis was conducted by adding 
ideology as a categorical variable (1-3: liberal, 4-7: conservative) into the 2 x 4 
ANOVA, a significant three-way interaction was observed, F(3,162)=  2.64, p=.05, 
p
2
 =.05. Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni correction showed that the effect that 
was observed for the LLL behaviors (slowing down for the goal-yes key match 
condition only) was valid only for the conservative participants. When the effect of 
PNS (instead of ideology) was analyzed by adding this factor as a categorical 
variable, the three-way interaction between match type, behavior type and PNS turned 
out to be nonsignificant, F(3,162)=  1.61, p=.19, p
2
 =.03. However, pairwise 
comparisons with Bonferroni correction comparing RTs for critical and control trials 
revealed that people with low PNS were slower in their correct rejections for both 
LLL and LHH behaviors compared to control behaviors in the goal-yes match 
condition (p<.001 and p=.03, respectively for LLL and LHH behaviors), supporting 
goal inference.
18
 No other significant difference in RTs for critical vs. control 
behaviors was observed for people with low or high PNS. When the pairwise 
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 The three way interaction between these factors was not significant F(3,162)=  1. 99, p=.12, p
2
 =.04 
18
 The pairwise comparisons in terms of PNS should be interpreted with caution as the three-way 
interaction between match type, behavior type and PNS was not significant.  
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comparisons were conducted by comparing different match type conditions, the 
following pattern was observed; while low PNS people were slower for LLL 
behaviors in the goal-yes match compared to trait-yes match condition (showing a 
tendency for goal inference), p<.05, high PNS people were slower for LHH behaviors 
in trait-yes match compared to goal-yes match condition (showing a tendency for trait 
inference), p<01.
19
 No other effects of individual difference were found.  
In order to deal with missing values and control for intra-individual variability 
in RTs, a PROC MIXED procedure was conducted in SAS software. As in the 
ANOVA, behavior type and match type were entered as the fixed factors while 
participant was entered as a random factor
20
. The results were similar with ANOVA. 
A significant main effect for behavior type emerged, F(3, 979)=  3.32, p=.02, while 
the main effect of match type was not significant, F(1, 985)= .55, p=.46. Importantly, 
the interaction between behavior type and match type remained significant, F(3, 
977)=  2.97, p=.03. Fixed effect solutions indicated that the interaction was 
characterized by the RT difference for LLL and control behaviors across different 
match type conditions, t(977)=  2.04, p=.04. The difference between least squares 
means with a Tukey adjustment specified a significant difference between the 
responses for LLL and control behaviors within the goal-yes key match condition 
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 When both ideology and PNS were entered as categorical variables into ANOVA, the four-way 
interaction was not significant, F(3,150)=  .47, p=.70. Still, pairwise comparisons showed that those 
who were conservative but also low in PNS slowed down in their correct rejections of implied words 
both in LLL and LHH sentences compared to controls in the goal-yes key match condition (supporting 
a goal inference). Also those people’s responses for LLL behaviors were slower in the goal-yes match 
than the trait-yes match condition, p=02. For people who were conservative and high in PNS as well, 
there was a significant slowdown for LHH behaviors in the trait-yes match compared to goal-yes match 
condition, p<01 (tentatively suggesting trait inference). None of the other comparisons turned out to be 
significant.  
20
 When the same analysis was done by entering stimuli intercept as a random factor as well, the model 
fit did not change. Also, when the slope for behavior type as well as subject intercept was entered as a 
random factor, the model fit got weakened (The AIC value increased). For these reasons, we decided to 
rely on the model which accounted for subject intercept only as the random factor.  
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only, t(979)=3.56, p=.009. The difference between the responses for LHH and control 
behaviors was not significant within the trait-yes key condition, t(979)=2.38, p=.25.  
Discussion 
The hypothesis for this study was partially supported. Specifically, we found 
support for goal inferences from the LLL behaviors. This effect was characterized by 
a slowing down in correctly rejecting words in LLL behaviors, only when this correct 
rejection requires a response switch from the key for goal categorization. On the other 
hand, we did not find any evidence of goal inference from the LHH behaviors. To the 
contrary, people’s correct rejections of words in the LHH behaviors overall slowed 
down when they had to make a response switch from the trait categorization 
(compared to the switch from the goal categorization), tentatively indicating a 
tendency for trait (more than goal) inference. Similar patterns for LLL and LHH 
behaviors had also been observed in Study 1.  
One possible factor that differentiates responses to LHH and LLL behaviors 
might be the difference in the consistency information. If consistency over time is 
perceived to be a (sufficiently) defining characteristic of the traits, people may have 
overly relied on this information (by disregarding distinctiveness information) and 
tended to make trait inferences. In this sense, rather “long-term goals” that were 
predicted to be implied by LHH behaviors may have been perceived to be more like 
traits than goals. At that point, it might also be useful to elaborate on whether people 
tend to make implicit inferences from complex behaviors mostly for the short-term 
but not for the long-term goals of others.  
 Interestingly however, we did not observe any trait inference for the trait-
implying LLH behaviors. This result was surprising in the light of the previous 
research showing trait inferences from these behaviors in explicit tasks (Bassili, 1989; 
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Hilton, Smith, & Kim, 1995; van Overwalle, 1997a, 1997b). This brings about the 
question whether this behavior configuration is not strong enough to elicit inferences 
in an implicit fashion. Another possible explanation may have something to do with 
the differential ease in processing of these types of behaviors with a goal of 
memorization. LLH behaviors define the actor in a clear and smooth fashion 
(somebody who acts the same way always with every type of entity) which may have 
facilitated the processing of these behaviors. Such ease of processing may have 
increased participants’ confidence in correctly rejecting the implied goals/traits from 
these behaviors. With LHH and LLL behaviors on the other hand, there might be a 
“surprise” factor in these behaviors (the point that the actor engages in this behavior 
only with/for a certain entity in LHH behaviors and the point that the actor engages in 
this behavior for the first time) which may have interfered with the processing of 
stimuli. I will elaborate on these alternative explanations in the general discussion 
section.  
Study 3. Implicit Trait and Goal Inference When Covariation 
Information is not Provided 
In the first two studies, we aimed to analyze our hypothesis that people’s 
tendency to make goal and trait inferences is affected by the information provided. An 
important point here, however, is that, most of the time people are not provided with 
this kind of information. Malle (2004, p. 128) suggested that, people may not be able 
to easily integrate covariation information when they are not specifically provided 
with it in the behavior. Rather, he maintained that, they tend to automatically fill in 
the missing information in the behavior by using strategies such as applying a general 
knowledge of similar events, contrasting the event with alternatives, simply browsing 
generative mechanisms and projecting their own mental state onto the actor’s. Taking 
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this into consideration, we also aimed to examine people’s implicit inferences for the 
behaviors which do not include any explicit information about the consistency, 
distinctiveness or consensus of the actor’s action. 
Analyzing trait and goal inferences for behaviors without covariance 
information is also critical for another reason. In the classic STI studies, many of the 
behaviors that imply traits include consistency information (e.g., She always drove a 
little slower than the speed limit, she dusted and vacuumed her room every day) 
(Uleman, Hon, Roman, & Moskowitz, 1996). This brings to mind the question 
whether STIs depend on such consistency information (also considering the tendency 
to make trait inferences for LHH behaviors in Study 2). The present study provided us 
the opportunity to test this possibility by analyzing STIs for behaviors without any 
explicit consistency information.  
Another point that may facilitate STIs in the previous studies is the integration 
of trait information explicitly in the filler sentences used in the false recognition 
paradigm (see Todorov & Uleman, 2002). These sentences were constructed to detect 
participants’ hits (as they should respond “yes” to the question whether that word was 
included in the sentence) and they explain a trait implying behavior by actually 
including the trait word. One potential problem with this might be, (unintentionally) 
creating a trait mind-set throughout the procedure that artificially inflates trait 
inferences for any behaviors processed across the entire set of behaviors. In order to 
control for this possibility, we used behaviors that included the trait information, goal 
information or neither of them as fillers in the present study.  
We administered a false recognition task in order to measure implicit inference 
instead of a probe recognition task in this study. One advantage of false recognition 
task over probe recognition task is the ability to check not only implicit inferences 
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from behaviors but also binding of inferred traits/goals to the actor of behavior (i.e., 
specific faces matched with the behaviors) (Todorov & Uleman, 2002).
21
 
In addition, we would like to further examine the manipulability of the 
different types of social inferences, namely goal and trait inferences. Previous 
research showed that the tendency to make implicit trait inferences is also affected by 
motivational factors such as PNS; those who are higher in need for structure are more 
likely to make trait inferences (Moskowitz, 1993a). Still, we do not know how 
motivational factors differentially affect tendencies to make implicit goal vs. trait 
inferences. Taking this into consideration, we also manipulated the motivation to 
make goal and trait inferences (as in Study 1).  
If people implicitly infer both goals and traits from behaviors that contain no 
covariation information, we should observe an equal tendency to falsely recognize 
goal and trait information in the behaviors learned (when no specific goal inference 
manipulation was induced). However, if a certain type of inference is a result of a 
motivation factor (e.g., induced by the context or certain type of stimuli used), the 
tendency to make one type of inference should be manipulated externally.  
Specifically, people should be more likely to make trait (vs. goal) inferences when 
they are trained to make trait inferences. Therefore, the tendency to make false 
recognitions for the traits in the critical (vs. control) trials should be more likely than 
falsely recognizing goals in the critical (vs. control) trials. On the other hand, being 
trained to make goal inferences should target and increase goal rather than trait 
inferences. Thus, we predicted a boost in the goal inferences more than trait 
inferences in the goal inference goal condition. In addition, it was possible to observe 
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 We could not use false recognition task in the first study due to the much more complicated stimuli 
used in that study. In the false recognition task, the recognition phase is administered after all the 
stimuli are processed. Therefore, we believe that, the memory for complex behavioral information 
should decay (or get interfered) more dramatically than observed in the classic false recognition studies 
with simple behavioral information.  
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a corresponding pattern with the RTs in correctly rejecting goal and trait words in 
critical trials. Specifically, when people correctly reject having seen the word which 
was implied from the behavior, they can be slower to do so, again showing that they 
implicitly associated this trait or goal with the given behavior. Therefore, it was 
possible to see a higher RT in correct rejections of goals in the critical (vs. control) 
trials under goal inference goal and a higher RT in correct rejections of traits in the 
critical (vs. control) trials under trait inference goal condition. People in the control 
condition, however, should not differ in terms of their RTs when they correctly reject 
having seen traits or goals in these behaviors.   
Method 
Participants. 152 participants (88 females, Mage= 37.99, SDage= 11.32) were 
recruited through Amazon Mturk. Participants in the control condition (who did not 
engage in the first training session) received $0.75 and participants in the 
experimental condition got $1.00 in return for their participation.  
Materials and Procedure.  
Goal Manipulation. Participants were randomly assigned to goal inference 
goal, trait inference goal and no goal (control) conditions via Qualtrics (the whole 
study was programmed on Qualtrics). Goal and trait inference goal manipulation 
procedures were the same as those used in Study 1. In the control condition, however, 
participants skipped the goal manipulation and engaged in the false-recognition task 
only.  
False Recognition Task. Instead of using the behaviors with covariation 
information which imply the same semantic information as traits or goals (e.g., goal to 
achieve versus an achieving person), we used simple behaviors which imply different 
concepts as goals and traits. We selected the behaviors, first, based on the findings of 
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the pilot study in which people were explicitly asked about the traits and goals they 
can infer from the given behaviors (see the related section for the details). 25 
sentences that each was found to imply different concepts as goal and trait were 
selected from this behavior list. After all consensus, consistency and distinctiveness 
information were removed, we conducted a pilot test with 20 different Amazon 
MTurk participants in which they were asked to1) write about the specific traits and 
goals they can infer from each behavior, and 2) rate to what extent they think a 
goal/trait represents this person’s goal/trait (specific goals and traits were selected 
from the responses given in the first pilot study) on a 5 point scale. We selected 10 
critical behaviors, each implying a trait and a goal which 1) matched with most 
participants’ explicit responses, 2) had an average representativeness rating of 3.5 and 
up (out of 5), and 3) were rated as being roughly equally representative of the 
person’s perceived trait and goal (the differences of the ratings between traits and 
goals ranged from .05 to .8). We also selected 6 behaviors in order to use as control 
behaviors (see below for how these behaviors were used). Next, we created 16 filler 
behaviors. 6 of these behaviors implied a trait and included the trait word, 6 of them 
implied a goal and included the goal word and 4 of them did not specifically imply a 
goal or a trait but included the word being asked (Appendix F).  These 32 behaviors 
were constructed in such a way that half of them were initiated by females and half of 
them by males in each behavior category (i.e., control, critical and filler behaviors).  
The task consisted of an exposure phase and a recognition phase. In the 
exposure phase, participants were asked to learn about 32 behaviors that were 
matched with actor pictures (16 males and 16 females from different ethnicities) for a 
later memory task. Each picture contained an actor’s face with a neutral facial 
expression on a plain background.  Each behavior was randomly matched with one of 
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these actor pictures. This randomization was repeated for each individual in such a 
way that everybody was exposed to unique behavior-actor pairs (behaviors initiated 
by female actors were randomly matched with pictures of females and behaviors 
initiated by male actors were randomly matched with pictures of males).  
After the exposure, in the recognition phase, participants were told that they 
would see the pictures of the people they just learned about one more time but this 
time the pictures will be matched with certain words. Their task was to indicate 
whether that specific word had been presented as part of the sentence that had been 
paired with that specific person, by clicking on yes or no options. We also specified 
that, if the word had appeared in a sentence but paired with a different face, their 
answer would be “no” (they should respond yes if the face and word had actually 
been paired together earlier). Participants were asked to respond as quickly as 
possible.   
In this recognition phase, for the critical trials, half of the participants received 
trait words (trait memory condition) and half of them received goal words (goal 
memory condition) that were implied from the behaviors seen in the first phase. In 
these trials, although the behavior which implies the goal or the trait was correctly 
paired with the actor shown in the exposure, the correct answer would be “no” as the 
goal or trait word was not actually included in the behavior. In the control trials, the 
goal or trait word being asked
22
 was again only implied by one of the behaviors in the 
exposure phase but also it was implied for an actor other than the one paired with the 
word in this phase. The difference in the tendency to falsely recognize the words in 
the critical and control trials would indicate automatic association of the words with 
specific actors while encoding the behavioral information. Filler trials in which 
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 In the goal (/trait) memory condition, participants were asked about only goal (/trait) words in the 
control trials. 
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participant’s correct response would be “yes” were used to assure participants that the 
words being asked were actually included in some of the trials.  
Measures of Individual Differences. The same measures used in the first two 
studies were applied after the false recognition task. 
Design. A 2 (behavior type: critical, control) x 2 (trait vs. goal memory) x 3 
(goal manipulation: trait, goal, control) mixed design was administered.  The first 
factor was measured within and the last two factors were measured between subjects.  
Results 
 False Recognition. In order to measure people’s tendency to falsely recognize 
critical (vs. control) trials across different goal manipulation and word type 
conditions, we applied a 2 x 2 x 3 mixed factorial ANOVA. The percentage of false 
recognition within control and critical trials was taken as the dependent variable in 
this analysis (see Figure 5).
23
 Results revealed a main effect of behavior type, F(1, 
146)= 27.29, p< .001, p
2
 =.16, characterized by lower overall false recognition for 
control trials (M= .31, SD=.20) compared to critical trials (M= .42, SD=.26). There 
was a main effect of word type, F(1, 146)= 3.97, p=.05, p
2
 =.03; indicating that, 
people’s overall false recognition (for critical and control trials) was lower when they 
were asked about goal words than trait words (see Figure 5). False recognition was 
comparable across different goal manipulation conditions as the main effect of goal 
manipulation turned out to be insignificant, F(2, 146)= 1.27, p=.28, p
2
 =.02. 
 The analysis also showed a significant interaction between induced goal and 
behavior type on memory, F(2, 146)= 5.11, p<.01,p
2
 =.06. Pairwise comparisons 
with Bonferroni correction indicated that while people’s false recognition for critical 
                                                          
23
 None of the participants’ average accuracy exceeded +/- 3 SD so we included all the participants in 
this analysis.  
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sentences was higher than control sentences in both goal and trait inference goal 
conditions (F(1, 146)= 11.11, p=.001,p
2
 =.07 and F(1, 146)= 25.58, p<.001,p
2
 =.15 
respectively), they were equal for critical and control behaviors when they did not 
receive a goal manipulation, F(1, 146)= .39, p=.53,p
2
 =.003. On the other hand, the 
goal manipulation did not differentially affect the accuracy across goal and trait 
words, as the interaction between goal manipulation and word type was not 
significant, F(2, 146)= .25, p=.78,p
2
 =.003.The interaction between behavior and 
word type was also not significant, F(1, 146)= .39, p=.53,p
2
 =.003, as control 
behaviors were better remembered than critical trials both when traits and goals were 
being asked.  
 The three-way interaction between goal manipulation, behavior type and word 
type was not significant, F(2, 146)= .39, p=.68,p
2
 =.005. Still, when Pairwise 
comparisons with Bonferroni corrections were considered, there was an interesting 
pattern of relationship across these three factors. When participants had a goal to form 
goal inferences they were more likely to falsely recognize goals in the critical than 
control trials, F(1, 146)= 5.28, p=.02,p
2
 =.035, but they were also more likely to 
falsely recognize traits in the critical than control trials, F(1, 146)= 5.85, p=.02,p
2
 
=.04. Similarly, when participants had a goal to form trait inferences they were more 
likely to falsely recognize traits in the critical than control trials, F(1, 146)= 17.24, p< 
.001,p
2
 =.11, but they were also more likely to recognize goals in the critical than 
control trials, F(1, 146)= 8.74, p<.01,p
2
 =.06. On the other hand, in the control 
condition where people did not go through any goal manipulation, there were no 
differences in the false recognition for control and critical trials for neither goal nor 
trait words, Fs<1. These findings indicate that people did not implicitly infer goals or 
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traits (that are bound to specific actors) unless they experienced a goal manipulation 
that encouraged the formation of such inferences. 
 Next, we turned to explore the possible effects of individual difference 
variables (ideology, pns and nc) on false recognition. When ideology was entered as a 
categorical variable into the analysis explained above, a significant three-way 
interaction between behavior type (critical vs. control), word type and ideology 
occurred, F(1, 140)= 4.51, p=,035,p
2
 =.03. Simple effect analyses with Bonferroni 
correction comparing false recognitions for critical and control trials across different 
goal manipulation and word type conditions revealed interesting differences between 
liberals and conservatives (see Figure 6). When participants did not receive any goal 
manipulation, the only (marginally) significant difference between critical and control 
trials (as an indication of inference) was observed for liberals and for goal words only, 
p=.06. However, after adopting a goal to form goal inferences, liberals’ responses 
indicated a support for goal inferences (characterized by significantly higher false 
recognition of goals in the critical than the control trials,  p<.05), while conservatives’ 
responses revealed a trait inference (characterized by significantly higher false 
recognition of traits in the critical than the goal trials,  p<.05). After adopting a goal to 
form trait inferences, both liberals and conservatives showed evidence of both types 
of inferences, ps<.06.  
 When PNS was entered as a categorical variable, we found a marginally 
significant four-way interaction between PNS, behavior type, word type and goal 
manipulation condition. F(1, 137)= 2.53, p=.08,p
2
 =.04 (see Figure 7). Pairwise 
comparisons with Bonferroni corrections were conducted to compare false 
recognition for critical and control trials across low and high PNS people within 
different goal manipulation and word type conditions. In the control condition, we did 
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not find any significant difference for low or high PNS people, ps>.3. After adopting 
a goal to form goal inferences, however, while low PNS people tended to make only 
goal inferences (characterized by higher false recognition of goals in critical than 
control trials,  p<.05), high PNS people tended to make only trait inferences 
(characterized by higher false recognition of traits in critical than control trials,  
p<.05). In the trait inference goal condition, again a similar pattern was observed 
(p<.01 and p<.001, respectively for low PNS people/goal words and high PNS people 
/trait words). Also low PNS people tended to make more false recognitions for the 
trait words in the critical than the control condition, p=.08. No other differences were 
significant. Also, we did not find any differences in terms of NC and individualism-
collectivism variables.  
 In order to account for inter-individual (and inter-stimuli) variances, a PROC 
GLIMMIX procedure was conducted in SAS software by focusing on accuracy in 
individual responses (instead of averages within certain behavior types) as the 
dependent variable. As in the ANOVA, goal manipulation condition, word type and 
behavior type were entered as fixed factors. The intercept for the participant was 
entered as a random factor into the model. As in ANOVA, the main effect of behavior 
type was significant in this analysis, F(1, 2274)= 23.29, p<.0001, as a result of more 
accuracy for control compared to critical trials, t(2274) =3.79, p<.001.
24
 The main 
effect of word type also remained significant, F(1, 2274)= 4.28, p=.04. Trait words 
were more likely to be falsely recognized than goal words in general, t(2274)=2.21, 
p=03. Another effect that remained significant was the interaction between goal 
manipulation and behavior type on memory, F(1, 2274)= 3.04, p=.05. While words in 
the critical sentences were falsely recognized more than the control words under both 
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 Tukey adjustment was applied in all pairwise comparisons.  
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goal, t(2274) =3.73, p<.01, and trait inference goal conditions, t(2274) =4.30, 
p<.0001, there was no such difference under no goal manipulation condition. None of 
the other effects were found to be significant, ps>.3.  
Comparisons across critical and control trials revealed that false recognitions 
were higher for critical trials when 1) under trait inference goal condition when the 
word type was a trait, t(2274) =3.79, p<.001, 2) under trait inference goal condition 
when the word type was a goal, t(2274) =2.25, p=.03, 3) under goal inference goal 
condition when the word type was a trait, t(2274) =2.50, p=.01, 4) under goal 
inference goal condition when the word type was a goal, t(2274) =1.81, p=.07. On the 
other hand, when there was no goal manipulation, critical trials did not differ from 
control trials in terms of false recognition (whether the word being asked was a goal 
or a trait, ps>.4). Also, under trait inference goal manipulation condition, trait words 
in the critical trials were falsely recognized more than goal words in these critical 
trials, t(2274) =2.23, p=.03. Under goal inference goal, trait and goal words were 
equally falsely recognized, t(2274) =1.26, p=.2.
25
  
RTs. Participants responded to 1520 trait/goal implying trials in total and 912 
of these trials (60%) were correctly rejected. Among 900 control trials, 632 were 
correctly rejected (70%). We applied a 2-step outlier analysis due to extraordinarily 
slow responses that biased the outlier analysis at the first step. 49 responses at the first 
step and 63 responses at the second step were found to be 3SD above the mean RT 
and were removed. We also removed 4 data points that were below 200 ms. 
Therefore, approximately 8% of the data points had to be removed in total and 
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 Despite these differences, direct comparisons of the differences under trait mind-set for the critical 
and control trials within goal and trait word conditions did not reveal a significant difference, t(2274)= 
1.21, p=.22. This result makes it hard to interpret whether people under trait mind-set actually are more 
likely to make trait than goal inferences. Still, considering the performance for critical trials tentatively 
supports this argument.  
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average RTs for critical and control trials were calculated based on the remaining 
data.  
A 2 x 2 x 3 mixed factorial ANOVA was conducted to analyze the differences 
in RTs for correctly rejected critical and control trials across the two word type and 
three goal manipulation conditions (see Figure 8). The analysis indicated a main 
effect of behavior type, F(1, 141)= 4.10, p<.05,p
2
 =.03, characterized by slower 
responses overall for critical (M= 2683.1, SD=896.82)  compared to control 
(M=2585.3, SD=846.47)  trials. None of the other effects turned out to be significant, 
ps>.3. The individual difference variables did not have a role on any of the findings.  
 The differences in RTs were also analyzed by using a PROC MIXED 
procedure on SAS including a person level random intercept.
26
 This intercept turned 
out to be significant, Z= 7.39, p<.0001, indicating differential RTs overall across 
participants. Consistent with the ANOVA, the only significant fixed effect was the 
main effect of behavior type, F(1, 1350)= 4.79, p=.003, as a result of the slower RTs 
for critical compared to control behaviors, p=.08. None of the other fixed effects were 
significant. Still, we conducted planned contrasts with Bonferroni correction across 
RTs for critical and control trials within goal and trait goal manipulation conditions.
27
 
These analyses revealed a marginally significant difference, indicating slower correct 
rejections for traits in the critical compared to control trials in the trait inference goal 
condition, t(1349)=-1.76, p=.08. Other differences across RTs for critical and control 
trials were not significant, ps>.3.  
 Discussion 
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 The same analysis was also conducted by entering stimuli intercept as a random factor. This analysis 
did not improve the model significantly. When the slope for behavior type as a function of participants 
was entered into the model as a random factor, the model fit did not change as well (ps for the 
comparisons of -2restricted LLs> .7).  
27
 This analysis was conducted in order to check if the pattern for higher tendency to falsely recognize 
critical (vs. control) behaviors was also characterized by slower correct rejections for these behaviors 
under goal and trait mind-set conditions.  
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 In this experiment, when people were not provided with the covariance 
information (consistency, distinctiveness or consensus) about the behaviors, they 
tended to make neither goal nor trait inferences. They made both types of inferences, 
however, as long as they were exposed to goal manipulation that encouraged some 
form of inferencing.  Also, they tended to make more trait inferences than goal 
inferences when they were in the trait inference goal condition. These results bring to 
mind a couple of questions.  
First, are implicit inferences mostly based on motivational factors? When we 
prevented a behavior’s “speaking for itself” in terms of traits and goals by taking out 
the embedded covariation information in this study, people’s STIs and SGIs became 
contingent on the goal manipulation. This suggests that people may need to be 
specifically motivated to go beyond the given information and make implicit 
inferences unless the behavior implies the relevant goal/trait in a strong fashion (e.g., 
due to the covariation information or extremity of the behavior, or due to the filler 
trials strongly promoting trait inference by including the traits in the filler sentences).  
We expected each goal manipulation to distinctively affect each type of 
inference. Nevertheless, both types of goal manipulations led to a boost in both STIs 
and SGIs (although trait inference goal manipulation resulted in more pronounced 
STIs). We can think of various possible explanations for this result.  First, one type of 
inference might have increased the accessibility of the other. As mentioned 
previously, the concepts of goals and traits are not easily dissociable. A trait might be 
easily associated with a goal or a goal may be expected to define a trait automatically. 
Some of (but not all of) the behaviors we used in this study imply associable traits and 
goals in this sense (e.g., frugal and to save). Another possibility is that, both goal 
manipulations may have created an effect on the depth of processing of the behaviors 
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in the false recognition task as well. Those who got either of the goal manipulation 
(trait or goal inference) may have been primed to go beyond the information given in 
the false recognition task, resulting in both STIs and SGIs.  
Alternatively, some people may have a naïve theory in mind about traits 
giving rise to goals or goal’s giving rise to traits, which may have led to both types of 
inferences observed after both types of goal manipulations. This naïve theory, for 
example, may have led people who were asked to make goal inferences in the first 
task to make trait inferences as well as goal inferences during this manipulation. As 
suggested in the introduction, conservatives and people with high PNS are especially 
motivated to make dispositional attributions in explaining the causes of behaviors 
(Neuberg & Newsom, 1993; Thompson, et al., 2001). Consistently, we found that, 
both conservatives and people with high PNS made only trait inferences even when 
they were asked to make goal inferences over and over again in the first task (while 
liberals and low PNS people inferred only goals in this case). This finding also 
suggests that our materials successfully captured different types of inferences as such 
individual differences in the types of inferences made is very much in parallel with 
what previous research suggests about the psychological correlates of ideology and 
personal need for structure.  
General Discussion 
 People make inferences from others’ behaviors for various reasons. 
Importantly, they predict others’ future behaviors based on inferences and adjust their 
own behaviors accordingly (Aarts, Gollwitzer, & Hassin, 2004; Gollwitzer & 
Moskowitz, 1996). When people infer invariant characteristics of others, like traits, 
they expect them to engage in similar behaviors across different situations and over 
time. However, people may infer variant characteristics of others as well, which 
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requires them to account for the specific context while making their inferences and 
related future predictions. The latter types of inferences, namely goal inferences, are 
sophisticated as they need to be represented in terms of different actor-situation or 
actor-stimulus conditions in mind. Yet, this does not mean people do not rely on such 
variant representations of actors implicitly. Kelley’s (1967) covariation principle, as 
well as more recent models of person perception (Kammrath, Mendoza-Denton, & 
Mischel, 2005) highlighted such tendency in people to rely on rather complex 
schemas (represented by “if…then…” propositions) in their attributions in an efficient 
way. 
 In three experiments, we examined people’s tendency to implicitly infer 
variant (goal) as well as invariant (trait) characteristics of others from their behaviors. 
Previous research overly relied on inferences of invariant characteristics of others, 
both explicitly and implicitly (Malle, 2008). However, as suggested by Heider (1958), 
when an actor brings about a change in an environment, perceivers should be capable 
of processing that change and should tend to infer a specific goal of this actor. In this 
sense, the type of behavior perceivers received about the actor becomes critical in the 
type of inference made. Therefore, in Study 1 and 2, we focused on the role of 
received information on the type of implicit inference people made. Based on 
Kelley’s model, we focused on three different configurations of the three dimensions 
in a behavior; consensus, distinctiveness and consistency (i.e., LHH, LLL, LHH). 
Specifically, we suggested that, people should tend to make goal inferences from 
behaviors when low consistency is paired with low distinctiveness and when high 
consistency is paired with high distinctiveness information (under low consensus). 
These LHH and LLL behaviors were shown to be perceived as implying actor-
stimulus and actor-situation interactions respectively in previous research (Bassili, 
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1989; Hilton, Smith, & Kim, 1995; van Overwalle, 1997a, 1997b). On the other hand, 
we expected that people would make trait inferences implicitly from LLH behaviors 
since such inferences were already shown to explicitly occur in previous attribution 
research. 
 Study 1 did not reveal conclusive findings in terms of the effect of the type of 
covariation information provided on the type of implicit inference made, except for 
tentatively showing (as opposed to our predictions) that people may not be making 
similar types of inferences from LLL and LHH behaviors. In Study 2, which 
employed a rather fined-grained procedure in terms of differentiating goal and trait 
inferences, we found support for goal inferences from behaviors with LLL 
configuration. More specifically, people tended to infer goals from behaviors that the 
actors engaged in for the first time and in an interaction with various entities (objects, 
people, situations). These behaviors were shown to be perceived as being directed by 
an interaction between person and situation in the previous attribution studies (Bassili, 
1989; Hilton, Smith, & Kim, 1995; van Overwalle, 1997a, 1997b). As opposed to our 
expectations, however, we did not find any support for goal inferences from LHH 
behaviors that the actors engaged in over a period of time and in an interaction with a 
specific entity.
28
 On the other hand, when the (insignificant) patterns of findings in 
both Study 1 and 2 are considered, we observe a tendency to diverge from making 
goal inferences from LHH behaviors. In Study 1, following goal inference 
manipulation, participants made even fewer false recognitions of implied concepts 
from LHH than LLL sentences. In Study 2, they were slower to respond to these 
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 One possible explanation for not observing inferences of long term goals (as well as traits) is that 
people may be reserved to make these inferences unless they are motivated to do so (or unless, as with 
stereotypes and with strong STI sentences, there is another impetus to do so). In other words, making 
judgments about the somewhat permanent characteristics of others may be something people are 
reluctant to do in the absence of motivation or compelling reason as also supported by the findings in 
Study 3. 
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implied concepts when they had to make a response switch from trait rather than goal 
category. This finding may even imply that they almost tended to make trait 
inferences from these behaviors. But why this might be the case? 
 One potential explanation for these findings might be that people may have 
over-relied on the consistency information while discounting the distinctiveness 
information given. Still, we did not observe a similar tendency of trait inference for 
the LLH behaviors which also included high consistency information but paired with 
low distinctiveness. That is why we suggest that it should be something about the 
combination of high consistency and high distinctiveness that should have led people 
to engage in trait-like rather than goal-like inferences. Possibly, high distinctiveness 
may have created a “surprise effect” or may have been perceived to be somehow 
“counterfactual” if people have a naïve theory in mind that somehow associates high 
consistency with low distinctiveness. While high consistency indicates engaging in 
the same behavior consistently over time, low distinctiveness indicates engaging in the 
same behavior consistently in interaction with different objects, people and situations. 
So high distinctiveness (which comes after consistency information in the behaviors 
we used), may have been rather unexpected in this sense. The question here is 
whether this “unexpected” dimension of the behavior rendered consistency 
information more accessible by making the perceivers go back to the first information 
and question why this might be the case (and resulting in more trait-like inferences). 
In the LLH behaviors, on the other hand, people read about a person who behaves 
consistently over time and in interaction with different entities. LLH behaviors, in this 
sense, may be rather easily and smoothly processed and even if people have made 
related inferences, they may have had enough time during the 10-seconds-long 
presentation to notice that the implied trait was not actually included in the behavior. 
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In order to analyze these possibilities of one dimension (e.g., distinctiveness) affecting 
the interpretation of the other (e.g., consistency), we need to examine how inferences 
may be constructed and reconstructed by the each piece of information received. 
Therefore, we are planning to analyze the contribution of each piece of information to 
the inference made in the future. Thus, we would better understand how people 
differentially focus on or discount certain dimensions of the behaviors in the process 
of inference formation and how they form their ultimate inferences in the end.  
 Alternatively, we can interpret the differential findings for LHH and LLL 
behaviors in terms of the relative perceived probability of implying traits. The fact 
that LLL behaviors were one-time-only behaviors (as also emphasized in the second 
sentences, e.g., in the past he never clipped any kind of coupons out of the 
newspaper), participants may have found the characteristics implied as obviously 
“non-trait”. In LHH behaviors, however, there were no such strong statements that 
would potentially counteract trait inferences. Therefore, participants may have turned 
to trait inferences from LHH behaviors more than LLL behaviors.  
 We did not find any support for implicit trait inferences from neither complex 
nor simple behaviors (unless people engaged in a goal manipulation). These results 
contradict with the years of STI research which claimed that people should infer traits 
even from simple behaviors (e.g., Todorov & Uleman, 2002). We suggest that this 
result may stem from the fact that the sentences we used in the present research were 
either very complex or very simple in terms of the amount of information included. In 
the previous STI work, we noticed that materials either included some kind of high 
consistency (through using present tense and words like always, every day etc.) or 
implied low consensus (through extreme behaviors that implicitly suggests 
extraordinariness). This may be one reason for why participants in Study 3 did not 
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make trait (or goal) inferences from behaviors with no covariation information. 
Importantly however, previous research is silent about the specific effects of 
covariation information in implicit trait inferences. At that point, it is critical for the 
future research to pinpoint the exact amount richness of the behavior information that 
is necessary to trigger implicit inferences. Alternatively, observing no implicit 
inference from simple behaviors (without goal manipulation) may stem from the fact 
that this study (Study 3) was conducted on Amazon MTurk unlike previous studies. 
Taking the difficult nature of the task into consideration (as participants needed to 
correctly reject having seen the implied words for the specific actors), this study 
should be replicated in a lab context with potentially less distraction before 
concluding confidently that people do not  make implicit inferences from behaviors 
without covariance information. 
 Lastly, we found support for implicit goal and trait inferences from simple 
behaviors after having a goal to form either trait inferences or goal inferences 
triggered in a supposedly independent task. This suggests that people should be 
specifically motivated to make an inference from a simple behavior with no 
covariation information. Contrary to our expectations though, people did not 
exclusively infer the characteristic (goal or trait) of the actor that they were asked to 
infer in the goal manipulation phase. Instead, participants made both STIs and SGIs 
after making either goal or trait inferences in the first phase. On the surface, this 
might be because goals and traits are strongly related and our procedure could not 
differentiate potential differences as much as we aimed. Still, this does not seem to be 
the case for two reasons. First, we were able to observe some evidence that after the 
trait inference manipulation, participants became more likely to make trait rather than 
goal inferences. Second, the analyses yielded individual differences in terms of the 
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effect of the trait and goal inference manipulation on later inferences. Specifically, 
while conservatives and high PNS people made only trait inferences after goal 
inference manipulation, liberals and low PNS people actually made only goal 
inferences after this manipulation. This suggests that some people may have different 
naïve theories such as goals’ being raised from traits, which in turn make them think 
about traits of the actor even when they are asked to think about goals. Conservative 
and high PNS people may be more likely to form such naïve theories (than liberals 
and low PNS people) as being parallel with their chronic motivation to engage in 
categorical thinking as well as dispositional attributions (Eidelman, Crandall, 
Goodman, & Blanchar, 2012; Neuberg & Newsom, 1993; Olcaysoy Okten, 2012; 
Skitka et al., 2002). Although there is already evidence on high PNS people’s higher 
tendency to engage in STIs than low PNS people (Moskowitz, 1993), to our 
knowledge, there is no research on ideological differences in the formation of implicit 
inferences. This finding might be critical in this sense for pioneering future research 
on such potential differences.  
Concluding Remarks 
 As much as making inferences is critical for an ordinary person to make sense 
and make predictions of others, for researchers it is critical to understand 1) the 
content/type of inferences made, and 2) the circumstances under which an ordinary 
person is more likely or specifically motivated to engage in specific inferences. There 
has been years of research on implicit trait inferences, showing that people infer 
others’ invariant characteristics (namely traits) from the simple behavioral 
information provided, in a fast fashion and even without necessarily being aware of  
making such inferences. What we do not know much about, however, is how likely 
people are to infer others’ variant characteristics, namely goals, in a similarly implicit 
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fashion. And is it possible that the literature on trait inference has confounded trait 
inference and goal inference? 
 The present studies examined the role of the type of information as well as the 
perceivers’ motivation to make trait vs. goal inferences. People tended to make 
implicit goal inferences from behaviors which included low consensus (initiated only 
by the actor), low distinctiveness (initiated towards all the entities the actor interacted 
with) and low consistency (initiated for the first time). When consensus, 
distinctiveness and consistency information were not provided, people made neither 
trait nor goal inferences. Still, they made both types of inferences when they were 
trained to make either of them (i.e., their motivation to make a specific type of 
inference was temporarily activated) in an independent task. Also, some individual 
differences in terms of the type of inference made were observed when participants 
were trained to make goal inferences (but not when they were trained for trait 
inferences). While liberals tended to make goal inferences after goal inference 
training (as well as after no training), conservatives made trait inferences even after 
this training. Similarly, people low in PNS only made goal inferences, yet, people 
high in PNS only made trait inferences after this training.  
 All in all, these findings indicate that, people can potentially infer both traits 
and goals of others in an implicit fashion. However, what kind of characteristics 
perceivers implicitly infer depends on the content of the information they received as 
well as perceivers’ chronic or temporarily activated goals. What was also revealed 
from the present research is that goal and trait inferences probably work in an 
interactive fashion. Future research should bring to light the mechanism behind this 
interaction which may be different for people with different chronic motivations (e.g., 
if different types of inferences are made in parallel or sequential fashion; if people 
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such as liberals and those with low PNS develop preconscious control of certain 
inferences). Even though people can make both types inferences potentially, what 
type of inference they would rely on in making predictions of others’ future actions as 
well as in adjusting their own behaviors are other critical questions that are worth 
continuous research effort in the near future. 
 Understanding the types of inferences people make about others’ 
characteristics is critical for various reasons.  Inferring variant vs. invariant 
characteristics of others from their behaviors should shape perceivers’ future 
predictions about these actors as well as their adjustment of their own behaviors. 
Inferring invariant characteristics like traits may bias one’s perception of the other as 
this means s/he discounted the specific situation or entity that may have triggered the 
actor’s specific behavior in the first place. This tendency may give rise to (and 
possibly be affected by) stereotyping as well. On the other hand, inferring variant 
characteristics like goals should also lead to the expectation of variability in people’s 
future actions. That is, future behavior would be seen as depending on the actor’s 
interaction with different situations and entities. Taking such variability into account 
may also be a way to override the tendency to stereotype. Failing to take such 
variability into account, such as making an inference about an acquaintance being 
selfish for not sharing her/his book, 
or a collaborator being irresponsible based on her/his missing an appointment, or 
a student being lazy based on her/his performance in one class, may lead to 
devastating consequences in terms of social interactions. Goal inferences, in this 
sense, may play a crucial role in preventing such biased perceptions and expectations.    
 
 
79 
 
References 
Aarts, H., & Dijksterhuis, A. (2003). The silence of the library: environment, 
situational norm, and social behavior. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 84(1), 18-28. 
Aarts, H., Gollwitzer, P. M., & Hassin, R. R. (2004). Goal contagion: perceiving is for 
pursuing. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87(1), 23. 
Asch, S. E. (1946). Forming impressions of personality. The Journal of Abnormal and 
Social Psychology, 41(3), 258-290. 
Barbu, O. C. (2012). Using proc glimmix to analyze the animal watch: A web-based 
tutoring system for algebra readiness. (Unpublished dissertation). University 
of Arizona, US.  
Bargh, J. A. (1990). Auto-motives: Preconscious determinants of social interaction. In 
E. T. Higgins & R. M. Sorrentino (Eds.), Handbook of motivation and 
cognition: Foundations of social behavior (pp. 93-130). New York, NY, US: 
Guilford Press. 
Bargh, J. A. (1994). The four horsemen of automaticity: Intention, awareness, 
efficiency, and control as separate issues. In R. S. Wyer, & T. K. Srull (Eds.), 
Handbook of social cognition: Vol. 1, Basic processes (2nd ed., pp. 1–40). 
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Bargh, J. A. (1997). The automaticity of everyday life. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates 
Publishers. 
Bargh, J. A., Gollwitzer, P. M., Lee-Chai, A., Barndollar, K., & Trötschel, R. (2001). 
The automated will: nonconscious activation and pursuit of behavioral 
goals. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81(6), 1014-1027. 
80 
 
Bassili, J. N. (1989). Trait encoding in behavior identification and dispositional 
inference. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 15(3), 285-296. 
Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E., & Kao, C. F. (1984). The efficient assessment of need 
for cognition. Journal of Personality Assessment, 48, 306–307. 
Carlston, D. E., & Skowronski, J. J. (1994). Savings in the relearning of trait 
information as evidence for spontaneous inference generation. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 66(5), 840-856. 
Cantor, N., & Mischel, W. (1977). Traits as prototypes: Effects on recognition 
memory. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35(1), 38-48.  
Cantor, N., & Mischel, W. (1979). Prototypicality and personality: Effects on free 
recall and personality impressions. Journal of Research in Personality, 13(2), 
187-205.  
Carroll, J., Perkowitz, W., Lurigio, A., & Weaver, K. (1987). Sentencing goals, causal 
attributions, and personality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
52, 107-118. 
Cheng, P. W., & Novick, L. R. (1990). A probabilistic contrast model of causal 
induction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58(4), 545-567. 
Crawford, M. T., McCarthy, R. J., Kjærstad, H. L., & Skowronski, J. J. (2013). 
Inferences are for doing: The impact of approach and avoidance states on the 
generation of spontaneous trait inferences. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 39(3), 267-278.  
Dik, G., & Aarts, H. (2008). I want to know what you want: How effort perception 
facilitates the motivation to infer another's goal. Social Cognition, 26(6), 
737-754. 
81 
 
Eidelman, S., Crandall, C. S., Goodman, J. A., & Blanchard, J. C. (2012). Low-effort 
thought promotes political conservatism. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 38(6), 808-820. 
Elliot, A. J., & Fryer, J. W. (2008). The goal construct in psychology. Handbook of 
motivation science, 18, 235-250. 
Feather, N. (1985). Attitudes, values, and attributions: Explanations of 
unemployment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 48, 876-889. 
Fein, S., Hilton, J. L., & Miller, D. T. (1990). Suspicion of ulterior motivation and the 
correspondence bias. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58(5), 
753-764. 
Fitzsimons, G. M., & Bargh, J. A. (2003). Thinking of you: nonconscious pursuit of 
interpersonal goals associated with relationship partners. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 84(1), 148-164. 
Förster, J., Liberman, N., & Friedman, R. S. (2007). Seven principles of goal 
activation: A systematic approach to distinguishing goal priming from 
priming of non-goal constructs. Personality and Social Psychology 
Review, 11(3), 211-233. 
Gergely, G., Nádasdy, Z., Csibra, G., & Bíró, S. (1995). Taking the intentional stance 
at 12 months of age. Cognition, 56(2), 165-193. 
Gilbert, D. T. (1998). Ordinary personology. The Handbook of Social Psychology, 2, 
89-150. 
Gilbert, D. T., Krull, D. S., & Pelham, B. W. (1988). Of thoughts unspoken: Social 
inference and the self-regulation of behavior. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 55(5), 685-694. 
82 
 
Gilbert, D. T., Pelham, B. W., & Krull, D. S. (1988). On cognitive busyness: When 
person perceivers meet persons perceived. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 54(5), 733-740. 
Gollwitzer, P. M. (1993). Goal achievement: The role of intentions. In W. Stroebe & 
M. Hewtone (Eds), European Review of Social Psychology (Vol. 4, pp. 141-
185). Chichester: Wiley. 
Gollwitzer, P. M., & Moskowitz, G. B. (1996). Goal Effects on Action and Cognition. 
In E. T. Higgins & A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.), Social Psychology: Handbook 
of Basic Principles (pp. 361-399). New York: Guilford. 
Ham, J., & Vonk, R. (2003). Smart and easy: Co-occurring activation of spontaneous 
trait inferences and spontaneous situational inferences. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 39(5), 434-447. 
Ham, J., & Vonk, R. (2011). Impressions of impression management: Evidence of 
spontaneous suspicion of ulterior motivation. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 47(2), 466-471. 
Hassin, R. R., Aarts, H., & Ferguson, M. J. (2005). Automatic goal inferences. 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 41(2), 129-140. 
Heider, F. (1944). Social perception and phenomenal causality. Psychological 
review, 51(6), 358-374. 
Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: Wiley. 
Hilton, D. J., Smith, R. H., & Kim, S. H. (1995). Processes of causal explanation and 
dispositional attribution. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 68(3), 377-387. 
Hoffman, C., Mischel, W., & Mazze, K. (1981). The role of purpose in the 
organization of information about behavior: Trait-based versus goal-based 
83 
 
categories in person cognition. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 40(2), 211-225. 
Jaspars, J., Hewstone, M., & Fincham, F. D. (1983). Attribution theory and research: 
The state of the art. Attribution theory and research: Conceptual, 
developmental and social dimensions, 3-36.  
Jones, E. E., & Davis, K. E. (1965). A theory of correspondent inferences: From acts 
to dispositions. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 2, 219-266. 
Jones, E. E., Davis, K. E., & Gergen, K. J. (1961). Role playing variations and their 
informational value for person perception. The Journal of Abnormal and 
Social Psychology, 63(2), 302-310. 
Jones, E. E., & Harris, V. A. (1967). The attribution of attitudes. Journal of 
experimental social psychology, 3(1), 1-24. 
Jones, E. E., & Nisbett, R. E. (1971). The actor and the observer: Divergent 
perceptions of the causes of behavior (pp. 79-94). Morristown, NJ: General 
Learning Press. 
Judd, C. M., Westfall, J., & Kenny, D. A. (2012). Treating stimuli as a random factor 
in social psychology: a new and comprehensive solution to a pervasive but 
largely ignored problem. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology,103(1), 54-69. 
Kammrath, L., Mendoza-Denton, R., & Mischel, W. (2005). Incorporating if ... then 
... signatures in person perception: Beyond the person-situation dichotomy. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 88, 605–613. 
Kelley, H. H. (1967). Attribution theory in social psychology. Nebraska Symposium 
on Motivation, 15, 192-238. 
84 
 
Kelley, H. H. (1972). Attribution in social interaction. In E. E. Jones, D. E. Kanouse, 
H. H. Kelley, R. E. Nisbett, S. Valins, & B. Weiner (Eds.), Attribution: 
Perceiving the causes of behavior (pp. 1–26). Morristown, NJ: General 
Learning Press. 
Kruglanski, A. W., Shah, J. Y., Fishbach, A., Friedman, R., Chun, W. Y., & Sleeth-
Keppler, D. (2002). A theory of goal systems. Advances in Experimental 
Social Psychology, 34, 331-378. 
Krull, D. S., & Erickson, D. J. (1995). Judging situations: On the effortful process of 
taking dispositional information into account. Social Cognition, 13(4), 417-
438. 
Kunda, Z. (1987). Motivated inference: Self-serving generation and evaluation of 
causal theories. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53(4), 636-
647. 
Loersch, C., Aarts, H., Keith Payne, B., & Jefferis, V. E. (2008). The influence of 
social groups on goal contagion. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 
44(6), 1555-1558. 
Lupfer, M. B., Clark, L. F., & Hutcherson, H. W. (1990). Impact of context on 
spontaneous trait and situational attributions. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 58(2), 239-249. 
Malle, B. F. (2004). How the mind explains behavior: Folk explanations, meaning, 
and social interaction. MIT Press.  
Malle, B. F. (2008). Fritz Heider's legacy: Celebrated insights, many of them 
misunderstood. Social Psychology, 39(3), 163-173. 
85 
 
Malle, B. F., & Holbrook, J. (2012). Is there a hierarchy of social inferences? The 
likelihood and speed of inferring intentionality, mind, and personality. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 102(4), 661-684.  
McArthur, L.Z. (1972). The how and what of why: Some determinants and 
consequences of causal attribution. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 22, 171–193. 
McKoon, G., & Ratcliff, R. (1986). Inferences about predictable events. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, memory, and cognition, 12(1), 82-91. 
Mischel, W., Mendoza-Denton, R., & Shoda, Y. (2002). Situation-behavior profiles as 
a locus of consistency in personality. Current Directions in Psychological 
Science, 11(2), 50-54. 
Mischel, W., & Shoda, Y. (1995). A cognitive-affective system theory of personality: 
reconceptualizing situations, dispositions, dynamics, and invariance in 
personality structure. Psychological Review, 102(2), 246-268. 
Moskowitz, G. B. (1993). Individual differences in social categorization: The 
influence of personal need for structure on spontaneous trait inferences. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65(1), 132-142. 
Moskowitz, G. B. (2005). Social cognition: Understanding self and others. New 
York, NY: Guilford Press. 
Moskowitz, G.B. (2012). The Representation and Regulation of Goals. In A. Elliot, & 
H. Aarts (Eds.), Goal-Directed Behavior. New York: Psychology 
Press/Taylor and Francis. 
Moskowitz, G. B., Gollwitzer, P. M., Wasel, W., & Schaal, B. (1999). Preconscious 
control of stereotype activation through chronic egalitarian goals. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 77(1), 167-184. 
86 
 
Neuberg, S. L., & Newsom, J. T. (1993). Personal need for structure: Individual 
differences in the desire for simpler structure. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 65(1), 113-131. 
Niedenthal, P. M., Barsalou, L. W., Winkielman, P., Krauth-Gruber, S., & Ric, F. 
(2005). Embodiment in attitudes, social perception, and emotion. Personality 
and Social Psychology Review, 9(3), 184-211. 
Olcaysoy Okten, I. (2012). The effects of political ideology on interpersonal 
interaction: Does exposure to opposing ideology lead to resource depletion? 
(Unpublished master’s thesis). Bogazici University, Turkey.  
Palomares, N. A. (2013). When and how goals are contagious in social 
interaction. Human Communication Research, 39(1), 74-100. 
Pellegrini, R. J., Queirolo, S. S., Monarrez, V. E., & Valenzuela, D. M. (1997). 
Political identification and perceptions of homelessness: Attributed causality 
and attitudes on public policy. Psychological Reports, 80, 1139-1148. 
Plaks, J. E., Shafer, J. L., & Shoda, Y. (2003). Perceiving individuals and groups as 
coherent: How do perceivers make sense of variable behavior? Social 
Cognition, 21(1), 26-60. 
Poynor, D. V., & Morris, R. K. (2003). Inferred goals in narratives: Evidence from 
self-paced reading, recall, and eye movements. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 29(1), 3-9. 
Read, S. J., Jones, D. K., & Miller, L. C. (1990). Traits as goal-based categories: The 
importance of goals in the coherence of dispositional categories. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 58(6), 1048-1061. 
Reeder, G. D. (2009). Mindreading: Judgments about intentionality and motives in 
dispositional inference. Psychological Inquiry, 20(1), 1-18. 
87 
 
Reeder, G. D., & Trafimow, D. (2005). Attributing motives to other people. In B. F. 
Malle & S. D. Hodges (Eds.), Other minds: How humans bridge the divide 
between self and others (pp. 106-123). New York, NY: The Guilford Press.  
Reeder, G. D., Hesson-McInnis, M., Krohse, J. O., & Scialabba, E. A. (2001). 
Inferences about effort and ability. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 27(9), 1225-1235. 
Reeder, G. D., Vonk, R., Ronk, M. J., Ham, J., & Lawrence, M. (2004). Dispositional 
attribution: multiple inferences about motive-related traits. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 86(4), 530-544. 
Rim, S., Min, K. E., Uleman, J. S., Chartrand, T. L., & Carlston, D. E. (2013). Seeing 
others through rose-colored glasses: An affiliation goal and positivity bias in 
implicit trait impressions. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,49(6), 
1204-1209. 
Rim, S., Uleman, J. S., & Trope, Y. (2009). Spontaneous trait inference and construal 
level theory: Psychological distance increases nonconscious trait 
thinking. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45(5), 1088-1097. 
Schneider, W., Eschmann, A., & Zuccolotto, A. (2002). E-Prime reference guide. 
Pittsburgh, PA: Psychology Software Tools. 
Sela, A., & Shiv, B. (2009). Unraveling priming: When does the same prime activate 
a goal versus a trait? Journal of Consumer Research, 36(3), 418-433. 
Shah, J. (2003). The motivational looking glass: how significant others implicitly 
affect goal appraisals. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85(3), 
424-439. 
Skitka, L. J., Mullen, E., Griffin, T., Hutchinson, S., & Chamberlin, B. (2002). 
Dispositions, scripts, or motivated correction? Understanding ideological 
88 
 
differences in explanation for social problems. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 83(2), 470-487. 
Smith, E. R., & Miller, F. D. (1983). Mediation among attributional inferences and 
comprehension processes: Initial findings and a general method. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 44(3), 492-505. 
Snyder, M., & Jones, E. E. (1974). Attitude attribution when behavior is 
constrained. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 10(6), 585-600. 
Thompson, M. M., Naccarato, M. E., Parker, K. C., & Moskowitz, G. B. (2001). The 
personal need for structure and personal fear of invalidity measures: 
Historical perspectives, current applications, and future directions. In G. B. 
Moskowitz (Ed.), Cognitive social psychology: The Princeton symposium on 
the legacy and future of social cognition (pp. 19-39). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Todd, A. R., Molden, D. C., Ham, J., & Vonk, R. (2011). The automatic and co-
occurring activation of multiple social inferences. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 47(1), 37-49. 
Todorov, A., & Uleman, J. S. (2002). Spontaneous trait inferences are bound to 
actors' faces: evidence from a false recognition paradigm. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 83(5), 1051-1065. 
Triandis, H. C. & Gelfland, M. J. (1998). Converging measurement of horizontal and 
vertical individualism and collectivism. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 74(1), 118-128.  
Trope, Y. (1986). Identification and inferential processes in dispositional 
attribution. Psychological Review, 93(3), 239-257.  
Trope, Y. (1989). Levels of inference in dispositional judgment. Social Cognition, 7, 
296–314. 
89 
 
Uleman, J. S., Hon, A., Roman, R. J., & Moskowitz, G. B. (1996). On-line evidence 
for spontaneous trait inferences at encoding. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 22(4), 377-394.  
Uleman, J. S., Newman, L. S., & Moskowitz, G. B. (1996). People as flexible 
interpreters: Evidence and issues from spontaneous trait inference. Advances 
in Experimental Social Psychology, 28, 211-280. 
Uleman, J. S., Rim, S., Saribay, S. A., & Kressel, L. M. (2012). Controversies, 
questions, and prospects for spontaneous social inferences. Social and 
Personality Psychology Compass, 6(9), 657-673. 
Uleman, J. S., Saribay, S. A., & Gonzalez, C. M. (2008). Spontaneous inferences, 
implicit impressions, and implicit theories. Annual Review of Psychology, 59, 
329-360. 
Uller, C., & Nichols, S. (2000). Goal attribution in chimpanzees. Cognition, 76(2), 
B27-B34. 
Van der Cruyssen, L., Van Duynslaeger, M., Cortoos, A., & Van Overwalle, F. 
(2009). ERP time course and brain areas of spontaneous and intentional goal 
inferences. Social Neuroscience, 4(2), 165-184. 
Van Duynslaeger, M., Sterken, C., Van Overwalle, F., & Verstraeten, E. (2008). EEG 
components of spontaneous trait inferences. Social Neuroscience, 3(2), 164-
177. 
Van Duynslaeger, M., Van Overwalle, F., & Verstraeten, E. (2007). 
Electrophysiological time course and brain areas of spontaneous and 
intentional trait inferences. Social Cognitive and Affective 
Neuroscience, 2(3), 174-188. 
90 
 
Van Overwalle, F. (1997a). A test of the joint model of causal attribution. European 
Journal of Social Psychology, 27(2), 221-236.  
Van Overwalle, F. (1997b). Dispositional attributions require the joint application of 
the methods of difference and agreement. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 23, 974-980.  
Van Overwalle, F., Van den Eede, S., Baetens, K., & Vandekerckhove, M. (2009). 
Trait inferences in goal-directed behavior: ERP timing and localization under 
spontaneous and intentional processing. Social Cognitive and Affective 
Neuroscience, 4(2), 177-190. 
Van Overwalle, F., Van Duynslaeger, M., Coomans, D., & Timmermans, B. (2012). 
Spontaneous goal inferences are often inferred faster than spontaneous trait 
inferences. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 48(1), 13-18. 
Winter, D. G., John, O. P., Stewart, A. J., Klohnen, E. C., & Duncan, L. E. (1998). 
Traits and motives: toward an integration of two traditions in personality 
research. Psychological Review, 105(2), 230-250. 
Zárate, M. A., Uleman, J. S., & Voils, C. I. (2001). Effects of culture and processing 
goals on the activation and binding of trait concepts. Social Cognition, 19(3: 
Special issue), 295-323. 
Zucker, G. S., & Weiner, B. (1993). Conservatism and perceptions of poverty: An 
attributional analysis. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 23, 925-943. 
  
91 
 
Appendices 
Appendix A 
The List of Behaviors Tested in the Pilot Study (Patterns of Behaviors: LHH, 
LLH, LLL respectively)* 
Implied  
Word  
clean 
She dusted and vacuumed her home office every day. She does not do this to other 
rooms in her home. Nobody else dusts or vacuums their office every day.  
She dusted and vacuumed her home office every day. She does this to other rooms in 
her home as well. Nobody else dusts or vacuums all the rooms in their home every day.  
She dusted and vacuumed all the rooms in her house today. She never does this to any 
of the rooms in her house. Nobody else dusted or vacuumed all the rooms in their house 
today.  
thrifty 
He clipped food coupons out of the newspaper every week. He never clips coupons for 
other types of purchases. Nobody else clips food coupons every week.  
He clipped food coupons out of the newspaper every week. He always clips coupons for 
every type of purchases. Nobody else clips every type of coupons every week.  
He clipped coupons for different types of purchases out of the newspaper this week. In 
the past he never clipped any kind of coupons out of the newspaper. Nobody else 
clipped coupons out of the newspaper this week. 
fit 
Every week he jogs 3 miles on the treadmill in the office gym at least four times. If the 
office gym is closed he will not engage in any other exercise that week. Nobody else 
goes to the office gym to use the treadmill four times a week. 
Every week he jogs 3 miles on the treadmill in the office gym at least four times. If the 
office gym is closed he engages in other exercises that week. Nobody else goes to the 
office gym every week. 
This week he jogged 3 miles on the treadmill in the office gym at least four times and 
engaged in other exercises if the gym was closed. Previously he never did any kind of 
exercises. Nobody else went to the office gym to use the treadmill four times a week 
and engaged in other exercises when the gym was closed. 
punctual 
She arrives to work ten minutes early every morning. She is never early for any other 
appointment. Nobody else comes to work that early. 
She arrives to work ten minutes early every morning. She is always early for any 
appointment. Nobody else is always early for appointments.  
She arrived to all her appointments ten minutes early today. She is never early for any 
of her appointments. Nobody else arrived to all of their appointments ten minutes early 
today. 
cautious 
She always drives a little slower than the speed limit. In non-motorized vehicles (bikes, 
scooters, boats) she always drives as fast as possible. Nobody else always drives a little 
slower than the speed limit. 
She always drives a little slower than the speed limit. In non-motorized vehicles (bikes, 
scooters, boats) she also drives a little slower than the speed limit. Nobody else always 
drives a little slower than the speed limit. 
She drove a little slower than the speed limit in all the vehicles she used this week (car, 
bike). Before this week she always drove as fast as possible. Nobody else drove a little 
slower than the speed limit in all the vehicles this week. 
 
At the picnics, her stories always make people laugh so hard they have to hold their 
sides.  She never makes people laugh so hard at any other occasion (home, work). 
Nobody else makes people laugh so hard at the picnics.   
funny 
At the picnics, her stories always make people laugh so hard they have to hold their 
sides.  She always makes people laugh so hard at any occasion (home, work). Nobody 
else makes people laugh so hard at any occasion.   
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This week, the stories she told at various occasions (picnic, work, home) made people 
laugh so hard that they had to hold their sides.  She never makes people laugh so hard at 
any occasion. Nobody else makes people laugh so hard at various occasions.   
concerned 
She always calls the local radio talk show and complains about a nearby toxic waste 
dump. She never calls the local radio show to complain about any other environmental 
problems they face in the area she lives (e.g., contamination of drinking water, air 
pollution). Nobody else calls the local radio talk show to complain about this toxic 
waste dump.  
She always calls the local radio talk show and complains about a nearby toxic waste 
dump. She also always calls the local radio show to complain about all other 
environmental problems they face in the area she lives (e.g., contamination of drinking 
water, air pollution). Nobody else calls the local radio talk show to complain about the 
environmental problems.  
She called the local radio talk show and complained about various environmental 
problems they face in the area she lives (e.g., a nearby toxic waste dump, contamination 
of drinking water, air pollution). She never before called the local radio show to 
complain about any environmental problems they face in the area she lives. Nobody 
else called the local radio talk show to complain about any environmental problems 
they face in the area they live.   
relaxed 
He always leans back into his big chair and puts both his feet up onto the desk in his 
cubicle. He never puts his feet up onto any other furniture anywhere else. Nobody else 
puts their feet up onto their desks.  
He always leans back into his big chair and puts both his feet up onto the desk in his 
cubicle. He always puts his feet up onto any furniture everywhere. Nobody else puts 
their feet up onto any furniture everywhere.  
Today, both at office and home, he leaned back into the chair and put both his feet up 
onto any furniture in front of him. He never puts his feet up onto any furniture in front 
of him. Nobody else puts their feet up onto any furniture in front of them.  
generous 
The service is not exceptional, but she always leaves a 25% tip for the waitress in this 
restaurant. She never leaves that much of a tip in other restaurants. Nobody else leaves 
a 25% tip for the waitress in this restaurant. 
The service is not exceptional, but she always leaves a 25% tip for the waitress in this 
restaurant. She always leaves that much tip in all restaurants. Nobody else leaves a 25% 
tip for this waitress. 
The services were not exceptional, but she left a 25% tip for the waitresses in all the 
restaurants she went this week. She never leaves that much tip in restaurants. Nobody 
else leaves a 25% tip for the waitresses in all of these restaurants. 
social 
He walked up and introduced himself to the strangers at both the office parties and 
more casual parties he attended recently. He never introduces himself to strangers at 
any types of parties. Nobody else introduced themselves to the strangers at any of these 
parties.  
He always walks up and introduces himself to the strangers at the office parties. He also 
always talks to his acquaintances in the office parties. Nobody else introduces 
themselves to the strangers at the office parties.  
He walked up and introduced himself to the strangers and also talked 
to his acquaintances all night at the office party tonight. He had never introduced 
himself to the strangers or talked to his acquaintances all night at the parties before. 
Nobody else introduced themselves to the strangers or talked to their acquaintances all 
night at the office party.  
 
She always tells the prospective buyers about problems with her car. She never tells the 
prospective buyers about problems with any other stuff she sells. Nobody else tells the 
prospective buyers about problems with their car. 
She always tells the prospective buyers about problems with her car. She always tells 
the prospective buyers about problems with any stuff she sells. Nobody else tells the 
prospective buyers about problems with any stuff they sell.  
honest 
This time, she told the prospective buyers about problems with all the stuff she was 
selling. She never tells prospective buyers about problems with any of the stuff she 
sells. Nobody else tells the prospective buyers about problems with any stuff they sell. 
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helpful 
He always offers directions to the lost tourists. He never offers directions if he is not 
sure whether someone is a tourist. Nobody else offers directions to the lost tourists.  
He always offers directions to the lost tourists. He also always offers directions if he is 
not sure whether someone is a tourist. Nobody else offers directions to the lost tourists.  
He offered directions to the lost tourists and the local people recently. He had never 
offered directions to the tourists or local people before. Nobody else offered directions 
to the lost tourists or the local people recently.  
honest 
The employee always tells his boss about his use of the photocopier for personal 
business. He never tells his boss about the personal phone calls he makes. Nobody else 
tells their boss about the personal photocopies they made. 
The employee always tells his boss about his use of the photocopier for personal 
business. He also always tells his boss about the personal phone calls he makes. 
Nobody else tells their boss about the personal photocopies or phone calls they make.  
The employee told his boss about his personal use of the photocopier and telephone on 
one day last week. He has never before told the boss about personal photocopies and 
phone calls he makes. Nobody else tells their bosses about the personal photocopies and 
phone calls they make 
helpful 
He always slips $50 into his friend's purse. He never slips money into anyone else's 
purse. Nobody else slips money into their friend's purse.  
He always slips $50 into his friend's purse. He always slips money into all of his 
friends' purses. Nobody else slips money into their friends' purses. 
Today he slipped $50 into all of his friends' purses. He never slips money into anyone's 
purse. Nobody else slipped money into their friends' purses today.  
social 
He attends all the parties his childhood friend hosts. He never attends parties hosted by 
other people. Nobody else attends all the parties their childhood friends host.  
He attends all the parties his childhood friend hosts. He also always attends parties 
hosted by other people. Nobody else attends all the parties their childhood friends host.  
He attended all the parties hosted by anybody recently. He had never attended parties 
hosted by anybody before. Nobody else attended all the parties hosted by anybody. 
welcoming 
She always invites the newcomers to her house. She never invites the newcomers 
anywhere else. Nobody else invites the newcomers to their house.  
She always invites the newcomers to her house. She also always invites the newcomers 
to various places. Nobody else invites the newcomers to their house or any other 
places.  
This week she invited the newcomers to her house and several other places in the town. 
She never before invited newcomers to anywhere. Nobody else invites the newcomers 
to anywhere.  
   safe 
He always asked everyone to make sure to check their seat belts before starting off on 
the trip. He never checks the tires, the gas, the brakes, or explore why the "check 
engine" light was on. Nobody else checks the seat belts of their passengers before 
starting a trip. 
He always asks everyone to make sure to check their seat belts before starting off on the 
trip. He also always checks the tires, the gas, the brakes, or explore why the "check 
engine" light was on. Nobody else checks everything before starting a trip. 
Before starting off on the trip today, he asked everyone to make sure to check their seat 
belts and he checked the tires, the gas, the brakes, and explored why the "check engine" 
light was on. He never before asked anybody to check their seat belts or checked 
anything himself in the car before starting off on a trip. Nobody else checks the seat 
belts of their passengers and checks everything about the car before starting off on a 
trip. 
honest 
He always tells the cashier when he was given too much change in this store. He never 
does this in any other stores. Nobody else always tells the cashier in this store when 
they were given too much change.  
He always tells the cashier when he was given too much change. He always does this in 
all the stores. Nobody else always tells the cashier when they were given too much 
change.  
He told the cashier when he had been given too much change in every store this 
happened in the last couple of months. In the past he never told the cashier when he had 
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been given too much change. Nobody else told the cashier when they were given too 
much change in all these stores.  
helpful 
He keeps warning people not to smoke in the living room while his roommate is trying 
to quit. He always serves people coffee at home although his roommate is also trying to 
quit caffeine. Nobody else living in this house warns people about smoking in the living 
room. 
He keeps warning people not to smoke in the living room while his roommate is trying 
to quit. He also never serves people coffee at home as his roommate is also trying to 
quit caffeine. Nobody else living in this house warns people about smoking in the living 
room or avoids serving coffee. 
Today he kept warning people not to smoke in the living room and he did not serve 
coffee while his roommate is trying to quit smoking and caffeine. He had never warned 
people not to smoke or avoid serving coffee at home although his roommate has been 
trying to quit these for some time. Nobody else living in this house warned people about 
smoking or avoided serving coffee. 
concerned 
He always calls his Representative about increasing aid for the homeless. He never calls 
his Representative about aid for any other issues. Nobody else calls about increasing aid 
for the homeless.  
He always calls his Representative about increasing aid for the homeless. He always 
calls his Representative about aid for any issues. Nobody else calls about increasing aid 
for any issues. 
He called his Representative about increasing aid for people from different groups 
today. He never calls his Representative about aid for any groups. Nobody else thinks 
about increasing aid for people from different groups. 
 
*These behaviors were found to imply similar concepts as traits and goals in the pilot 
study. Therefore, 12 of these behaviors were used in the Study 1 and Study 2.  
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Appendix B 
Study 1 & 3 Goal Manipulation Task Materials (van Overwalle et al., 2012) 
Possible Goal/Trait Expressed Behaviors 
(G = to swim; T = sportive) Each morning, the man put his cap and 
goggles on his head, and jumped into the 
water.  
(G = to give a talk; T = shy) She stood in front of the class with her 
papers and her face turned red. 
(G = to tip; T = generous) After paying the bill, she left 5 dollars on the 
table.  
(G = to pay; T = impatient) Right after the meal, he went to the waiter 
with his card.  
(G = to commit suicide; T =unhappy) With the rope around his neck, he jumped 
from the stool.  
(G = to improve; T = severe) The teacher always took out her red pen and 
marked up the whole paper. 
(G = to win; T = persisting) When the man saw the finish line, he began 
to run faster.  
(G = to save [money]; T = stingy) She never spends all her money, unless she 
really has to.  
(G = to rest; T = sportive) After running, he lay on the couch.  
(G = to wash; T = lazy) He runs with the garden hose toward the car 
grudgingly. 
 
Filler (matched with gender/occupation cue) 
 
 The student shelved some journals two at a 
time. 
 On their dinner date, he ordered a white 
wine. 
 Her friend asked, “Are you doing anything 
Friday evening?” 
 While walking, the waitress takes out her 
cigarettes and a lighter. 
 He packs his swimsuit and sun protection 
and heads out the door. 
 The janitor sweeps the floor in the apartment 
hallway. 
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Appendix C 
Study 1 & 2 Behavior Lists Used in Probe Recognition Task 
Configuration Implied 
Word 
List 1- Behaviors 
LHH1 clean She dusted and vacuumed her home office almost every day. She does 
not do this to other rooms in her home. Nobody else dusts or vacuums 
their office almost every day.  
LHH2 thrifty He clipped food coupons out of the newspaper every week. He never 
clips coupons for other types of purchases. Nobody else clips food 
coupons every week.  
LHH3 fit Every week he jogs 3 miles on the treadmill in the office gym at least 
four times. If the office gym is closed he will not engage in any other 
exercise that week. Nobody else goes to the office gym to use the 
treadmill four times a week. 
LHH4 punctual She arrives to work ten minutes early every morning. She is never early 
for any other appointment. Nobody else comes to work that early. 
LLH5 cautious She almost always drives a little slower than the speed limit. In non-
motorized vehicles (bikes, scooters, boats) she also drives a little slower 
than the speed limit. Nobody else almost always drives a little slower 
than the speed limit. 
LLH6 funny At the picnics, her stories always make people laugh so hard they have 
to hold their sides.  She always makes people laugh so hard at any 
occasion (home, work). Nobody else makes people laugh so hard at any 
occasion.   
LLH7 concerned She repeatedly calls the local radio talk show and complains about a 
nearby toxic waste dump. She also always calls the local radio show to 
complain about all other environmental problems they face in the area 
she lives (e.g., contamination of drinking water, air pollution). Nobody 
else calls the local radio talk show to complain about the environmental 
problems.  
LLH8 relaxed He always leans back into his big chair and puts both his feet up onto 
the desk in his cubicle. He always puts his feet up onto any furniture 
everywhere. Nobody else puts their feet up onto any furniture 
everywhere.  
LLL9 generous The services were not exceptional, but she left a 25% tip for the 
waitresses in all the restaurants she went this week. She never leaves 
that much tip in restaurants. Nobody else leaves a 25% tip for the 
waitresses in all of these restaurants. 
LLL10 social He walked up and introduced himself to the strangers at both the office 
parties and more casual parties he attended recently. He never 
introduces himself to strangers at any types of parties. Nobody else 
introduced themselves to the strangers at any of these parties.  
LLL11 honest This time, she told the prospective buyers about problems with all the 
stuff she was selling. She never tells prospective buyers about problems 
with any of the stuff she sells. Nobody else tells the prospective buyers 
about problems with any stuff they sell. 
LLL12 helpful He offered directions to the lost tourists and the local people recently. 
He had never offered directions to the tourists or local people before. 
Nobody else offered directions to the lost tourists or the local people 
recently.  
  List 2 - Behaviors 
LLL1 clean She dusted and vacuumed all the rooms in her house today. She usually 
never does this to any of the rooms in her house. Nobody else dusted or 
vacuumed all the rooms in their house today.  
LLL2 thrifty He clipped coupons for different types of purchases out of the 
newspaper this week. In the past he never clipped any kind of coupons 
out of the newspaper. Nobody else clipped coupons out of the 
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newspaper this week. 
LLL3 fit This week he jogged 3 miles on the treadmill in the office gym at least 
four times and engaged in other exercises if the gym was closed. 
Previously he never did any kind of exercises. Nobody else went to the 
office gym to use the treadmill four times a week and engaged in other 
exercises when the gym was closed. 
LLL4 punctual She arrived to all her appointments ten minutes early today. She is 
never early for any of her appointments. Nobody else arrived to all of 
their appointments ten minutes early today. 
LHH5 cautious She almost always drives a little slower than the speed limit. In non-
motorized vehicles (bikes, scooters, boats) she always drives as fast as 
possible. Nobody else almost always drives a little slower than the 
speed limit. 
LHH6 funny At the picnics, her stories always make people laugh so hard they have 
to hold their sides.  She never makes people laugh so hard at any other 
occasion (home, work). Nobody else makes people laugh so hard at the 
picnics.   
LHH7 concerned She repeatedly calls the local radio talk show and complains about a 
nearby toxic waste dump. She never calls the local radio show to 
complain about any other environmental problems they face in the area 
she lives (e.g., contamination of drinking water, air pollution). Nobody 
else calls the local radio talk show to complain about this toxic waste 
dump.  
LHH8 relaxed He always leans back into his big chair and puts both his feet up onto 
the desk in his cubicle. He never puts his feet up onto any other 
furniture anywhere else. Nobody else puts their feet up onto their 
desks.  
LLH9 generous The service is not exceptional, but she always leaves a 25% tip for the 
waitress in this restaurant. She always leaves that much tip in all 
restaurants. Nobody else leaves a 25% tip for this waitress. 
LLH10 social He always walks up and introduces himself to the strangers at the office 
parties. He always introduces himself to strangers at any types of 
parties. Nobody else introduces themselves to the strangers at office 
parties.  
LLH11 honest She always tells the prospective buyers about problems with her car. 
She always tells the prospective buyers about problems with any stuff 
she sells. Nobody else tells the prospective buyers about problems with 
any stuff they sell.  
LLH12 helpful He almost always offers directions to the lost tourists. He also almost 
always offers directions if he is not sure whether someone is a tourist. 
Nobody else offers directions to the lost tourists.  
  List 3 - Behaviors 
LLH1 clean She dusted and vacuumed her home office almost every day. She does 
this to other rooms in her home as well. Nobody else dusts or vacuums 
all the rooms in their home almost every day.  
LLH2 thrifty He clipped food coupons out of the newspaper every week. He always 
clips coupons for every type of purchases. Nobody else clips every type 
of coupons every week.  
LLH3 fit Every week he jogs 3 miles on the treadmill in the office gym at least 
four times. If the office gym is closed he engages in other exercises that 
week. Nobody else goes to the office gym every week. 
LLH4 punctual She arrives to work ten minutes early every morning. She is always 
early for any appointment. Nobody else is always early for 
appointments.  
LLL5 cautious She drove a little slower than the speed limit in all the vehicles she used 
this week (car, bike). Before this week she always drove as fast as 
possible. Nobody else drove a little slower than the speed limit in all the 
vehicles this week. 
LLL6 funny This week, the stories she told at various occasions (picnic, work, 
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home) made people laugh so hard that they had to hold their sides.  She 
never makes people laugh so hard at any occasion. Nobody else makes 
people laugh so hard at various occasions.   
LLL7 concerned She called the local radio talk show and complained about various 
environmental problems they face in the area she lives (e.g., a nearby 
toxic waste dump, contamination of drinking water, air pollution). She 
never before called the local radio show to complain about any 
environmental problems they face in the area she lives. Nobody else 
called the local radio talk show to complain about any environmental 
problems they face in the area they live.   
LLL8 relaxed Today, both at office and home, he leaned back into the chair and put 
both his feet up onto any furniture in front of him. He never puts his 
feet up onto any furniture in front of him. Nobody else puts their feet up 
onto any furniture in front of them.  
LHH9 generous The service is not exceptional, but she always leaves a 25% tip for the 
waitress in this restaurant. She never leaves that much of a tip in other 
restaurants. Nobody else leaves a 25% tip for the waitress in this 
restaurant. 
LHH10 social He always walks up and introduces himself to the strangers at the office 
parties. He never introduces himself to strangers at any other types of 
parties. Nobody else introduces themselves to the strangers at the office 
parties.  
LHH11 honest She always tells the prospective buyers about problems with her car. 
She never tells the prospective buyers about problems with any other 
stuff she sells. Nobody else tells the prospective buyers about problems 
with their car. 
LHH12 helpful He almost always offers directions to the lost tourists. He never offers 
directions if he is not sure whether someone is a tourist. Nobody else 
offers directions to the lost tourists.  
 
 
  
99 
 
Appendix D 
Study 2 Categorization Training Task Materials (van Overwalle et al., 2012) 
Possible 
goals to be 
used 
Goal-implying Sentences 
to run Tommy took the ball and ran outside. 
to lose 
weight 
After the festivities, Kate decided to run each day.  
to borrow Debbie went with the books to the counter and showed her card.  
to pay Mike pointed to the cash register. 
to pee Sam turned to the tree and opened his zipper in one movement.  
to smoke After dinner Robert asked for a light from the boy who sat next to 
him.  
to ski When it was white outside, Don took his runners.  
to eat Amanda tore the package open with her mouth.  
to eat Jim ran with a growling stomach to the bakery.  
to seduce John gave a telling wink to the beautiful girl. 
to play *Frankie took the frisbee and went to the park 
to wrap *Russ took the box to the next room along with the wrapping paper. 
Possible 
traits to 
be used 
Trait-implying Sentences 
religious Jessica goes every Sunday to church and says her prayers every night 
before bedtime.  
impolite Little Oscar never says "thank you". 
sloppy Mary drops everything on the floor and never finds her stuff.  
clumsy Nancy often stumbles, and when she is doing the dishes, she often 
breaks the glasses and dishes.  
forgetful Martin does not even remember the appointments he made the day 
before.  
racist Willy refuses to rent cars to blacks.  
boring People yawned whenever Eddie spoke. 
clumsy Karl stepped on the toes of his girlfriend during the foxtrot.  
smart Erica took her first calculus course when she was 12 years old. 
determined Leonard tried for the past 4 years to play in the basketball team of the 
university.  
organized *Julianna arranged her books neatly on the shelf in alphabetical order. 
nervous *Matt's palms got sweaty when he thought about the exam. 
 
*These sentences were added to the stimuli used by van Overwalle et al. (2012) in 
order to equalize the number of stimuli with the ones used in the probe recognition 
phase (as these behaviors would be shown in between probe recognition trials as 
well). While the trait implying sentences were selected from previous research (Rim 
et al., 2009), goal implying sentences were created as being in line with the van 
Overwalle  and colleagues’ sentences.   
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Appendix E 
Study 2 Control & Filler Behaviors for Probe Recognition Task 
Words Behaviors for Practice Trials 
sleep 
She could not get herself to greet her new neighbors. She was feeling ill 
today. Everyone else has greeted these new neighbors. 
run 
He completed a marathon. He spent the rest of the day relaxing. Nobody 
else he knows completed this marathon.  
dinner 
He left the dinner party early tonight. He would get up early the next 
day. Nobody else left the dinner party early. 
elevator 
She walked into her office building and took the elevator up. She 
checked if anybody else was around before getting on the elevator. 
Nobody else at her office building was around yet. 
 
Filler Behaviors for Probe Recognition 
house 
She watched the street to look at the crowds.  When she did not watch 
the street, she spent time doing work around the house. Nobody else was 
looking at the crowds. 
colleagues 
He and his colleagues worked hard today. At home, his wife also worked 
hard. None of the other departments worked as hard today.  
exam 
He turned down an invitation to the party to study for his exam the next 
morning. He did not sleep that night due to studying. Nobody else in his 
class was invited to the party.  
friends 
He took his kids to the movies this weekend. He also met a couple of 
friends at the movies. None of them took their kids to the movies.  
circus 
He drove past the circus this weekend. He had never driven past the 
circus. Nobody else in the neighborhood drove past the circus that day.  
documents 
He was not sure about how to fill out his income tax return. He asked his 
friends about filling out the documents. None of his friends had started 
filling out their income tax returns yet. 
newspaper 
He drove to the newsstand, this morning. Later he went to a café to read 
his newspaper. Nobody else he knows had arrived to the café yet. 
meal 
He picked tea to follow his meal at the fancy restaurant. He never picks 
tea at other restaurants. Nobody else picked tea at the fancy restaurant. 
 
Control Behaviors for Probe Recognition 
violent 
He stopped and listened when he thought he heard a scream. After a 
minute of silence, he turned to work. Nobody else around heard a 
scream. 
modest 
She thought she lost track of the two year old. She was relieved when 
she found out that the kid was just next to her. Nobody around her 
thought that the kid was missing.  
neat 
When the other campers knocked on her cabin door, she loaned them her 
extra blanket. She asked them if they have any extra pillows. Nobody 
else had any extra materials.  
abusive 
After working on his paper, he started making plans for the weekend. He 
called his friends to ask if they have any plans. Nobody else had started 
making plans. 
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Appendix F 
Study 3 Behaviors for False Recognition Task 
Critical Behaviors Goal 
Word 
Trait  
Word 
She clipped food coupons out of the newspaper.  save frugal 
She called the local radio talk show and complained about a nearby toxic 
waste dump.  
awarenes
s  
concerned 
He lost track of the two year old he was babysitting when the pretty 
neighbor was around. 
flirt irresponsibl
e 
He picked his teeth at the end of the meal.  clean rude 
She arrived to work ten minutes early. prepared punctual 
After working on his term paper for about 20 minutes, he suddenly started 
making plans for the weekend.  
fun distracted 
He attends the parties his childhood friend hosts.  support loyal 
She drove to the newsstand, only half a block away.  quick lazy 
She couldn't get herself to greet her new neighbors. alone shy 
He walked up and introduced himself to the strangers at the office party.  network social 
Control Behaviors   
She watched her neighbor's house to see who came and went. stay 
warm 
selfish 
When the other campers knocked on her cabin door, she didn't loan them 
her extra blankets.  
entertain kind 
He turned down parties to study for organic chemistry.  help  generous 
He took the orphans to the circus.  succeed hardworkin
g 
He slipped $50 into his friend's purse. welcome friendly 
She invited the newcomers to her house. spy nosy 
Filler Behaviors   
He took the ball and ran outside to play. play  
After the festivities, she decided to run each day, hoping to lose weight. weight  
In order to borrow the book, she went to the counter and showed her card. borrow  
After dinner he wanted to smoke and asked for a light from the boy who 
sat next to him. 
smoke  
She ran with a growling stomach to the bakery to get something to eat.  eat  
He was trying to seduce the beautiful girl  and gave a telling wink.   seduce  
She is a religious person and goes every Sunday to church.  religious 
He is forgetful and does not even remember the appointments he made the 
day before.  
 forgetful 
She is clumsy and went tumbling down the stairs after missing a step.  clumsy 
She is caring and nursed the bird with a broken wing back to health.  caring 
He is honest and told his roommate that he broke their expensive TV at the 
party last night. 
 honest 
He is funny and told a story that made people laugh so hard they held their 
sides.  
 funny 
She put her t-shirts in the drawer.  t-shirts 
He played his music loud. music 
He wanted his friend to take back what he had said. take back 
She asked where the stars go shopping. shopping 
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Figure 1. The percentage of falsely recognized words in LHH (low consensus, high 
distinctiveness, high consistency), LLH (low consensus, low distinctiveness, high 
consistency) and LLL (low consensus, low distinctiveness, low consistency) 
behaviors across goal inference goal, trait inference goal and control conditions 
(Study 1). The error bars represent standard error of the mean.  
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Figure 2. The average reaction time for correctly rejected words in LHH (low 
consensus, high distinctiveness, high consistency), LLH (low consensus, low 
distinctiveness, high consistency) and LLL (low consensus, low distinctiveness, low 
consistency) behaviors across goal inference goal, trait inference goal and control 
conditions (Study 1). The error bars represent standard error of the mean.  
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Figure 3. The percentage of falsely recognized words in LHH (low consensus, high 
distinctiveness, high consistency), LLH (low consensus, low distinctiveness, high 
consistency), LLL (low consensus, low distinctiveness, low consistency) and control 
behaviors across goal-yes and trait-yes key match type conditions (Study 2). The error 
bars represent standard error of the mean.  
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Figure 4. The average reaction time for correctly rejected words in LHH (low 
consensus, high distinctiveness, high consistency), LLH (low consensus, low 
distinctiveness, high consistency), LLL (low consensus, low distinctiveness, low 
consistency) and control behaviors across goal-yes and trait-yes key match type 
conditions (Study 2). The error bars represent standard error of the mean.  
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Figure 5. The percentage of falsely recognized goal and trait words across goal 
inference goal, trait inference goal and control conditions (Study 3). The error bars 
represent standard error of the mean.  
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a.  
b.  
Figure 6. The percentage of falsely recognized goal and trait words by a) liberals b) 
conservatives across goal inference goal, trait inference goal and control conditions 
(Study 3). The error bars represent standard error of the mean.  
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a.  
b.  
Figure 7. The percentage of falsely recognized goal and trait words by a) people with 
low PNS (personal need for structure) b) people with high PNS across goal inference 
goal, trait inference goal and control conditions (Study 3). The error bars represent 
standard error of the mean.  
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Figure 8. The average reaction time for correctly rejected goal and trait words across 
goal inference goal, trait inference goal and control conditions (Study 3). The error 
bars represent standard error of the mean.  
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University).  
 
PUBLICATIONS & MANUSCRIPTS 
 
Moskowitz, G. B., Olcaysoy Okten, I., Gooch, C. M. (under revision). On race and time. Psychological 
Science.  
 
Saribay, S. A, Olcaysoy Okten, I., Yilmaz, O. (in press). Ideological orientations and psychological 
variables. In Ozlem D. Gumus (Ed.), Political Psychology. Ankara: Nobel Press.  
 
Gunsoy, C., Cross. S. E., Saribay, S. A., Olcaysoy Okten, I., & Kurutas, M. (in press). Would you post 
that picture and let your dad see it? Culture, honor and Facebook. European Journal of Social 
Psychology.  
 
Olcaysoy Okten, I. (2012). The effects of political ideology on interpersonal interaction: Does exposure 
to opposing ideology lead to resource depletion? (Unpublished master’s thesis). Bogazici University, 
Turkey.  
 
 
CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS 
 
Olcaysoy Okten, I., & Packer, D. J. (May, 2015). The impact of people’s own and others’ prejudicial 
attitudes on perceived trustworthiness of African-American faces. Poster to be presented at 
the 27th annual convention of the Association for Psychological Science (APS), New York, NY. 
 
Olcaysoy Okten, I., Moskowitz G. B., & Gooch, C. M. (May, 2015). Concern about appearing 
prejudiced and time perception. Poster to be presented at the 27th annual convention of the 
Association for Psychological Science (APS), New York, NY. 
 
Olcaysoy Okten, I., Moskowitz G. B., & Gooch, C. M. (February, 2015). The relationship between 
prejudice and time perception. Poster presentation at the 16th annual meeting of the Society 
for Personality and Social Psychology (SPSP), Long Beach, CA. 
 
Gunsoy, C., Cross. S. E., Saribay, S. A., Olcaysoy Okten, I., & Kurutas, M. (July, 2014). Would you post 
that picture and let your dad see it? Culture, honor and Facebook. Poster presentation at the 
22th International Congress of International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology 
(IACCP), Reims, France.  
 
Olcaysoy Okten, I., & Sarıbay, S. A. (February, 2014). The relationship between resistance to change 
and opposition to equality at political and personal levels. Poster presentation at the 15th 
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